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DIVERTING WATER FROM THE GREAT LAKES:
PULLING THE PLUG ON CANADA
INTRODUCTION
The proposition of a diversion of water from the Great Lakes
presents a controversial problem in international law. The Great Lakes
basin1 contains one-fifth of the world's surface fresh water supply2
and ninety-five percent of the surface fresh water available in North
America.3 Two-thirds of Canada's population live in the Great Lakes
basin.' In the United States, eight states border on the Great Lakes.'
Within these states are such heavily populated cities as Buffalo,
Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee The Lakes provide the
residents of the region with water for drinking, agriculture, industry,
recreation, and transportation.7 While the Lakes' supply of water ap-
pears almost unlimited,8 only a small percentage of the supply is
renewed annually.9 Thus, any diversion of water from the Lakes would
1. The Great Lakes basin includes the five Great Lakes, the connecting rivers,
channels, and canals, and the watershed area drained by these waterways. "The
drainage, from the heads of the system in the Superior and Michigan basins, proceeds
through Lakes Huron, St. Clair, Erie and Ontario to the St. Lawrence River and thence
to the Atlantic Ocean. The entire system constitutes a waterway which extends nearly
halfway across the North American continent." H. PINCUS. GREAT LAKES BASIN 4 (1962).
2. E. Schaeffer & M. Downs, Great Lakes Policy Issues and the 98th Con-
gress 2 (June 1984) (unpublished policy paper, available from the Center for the Great
Lakes, 433 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1733, Chicago, IL 60611).
3. Great Lakes Diversion, 1 GREAT LAKES REP. 1 (Sept.-Oct. 1984), [hereinafter
cited as Great Lakes Diversion].
4. D. PIPER, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 5 (1967).
5. These states are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. HAMMOND'S AMBASSADOR WORLD ATLAS 106 (1957).
6. Id.
7. "Today, thirty-seven million people live and work in the Great Lakes basin.
The lakes, along with their tributaries and connecting channels, provide not only
astonishing beauty, but also water for drinking, for industrial processing, for waste
treatment, and for the transportation of raw materials and finished products." The
Center for the Great Lakes 4 (1984) (informational pamphlet available from the Center
for the Great Lakes, see mailing address, supra note 2).
8. The Great Lakes contain six quadrillion (6,000,000,000,000,000) gallons of
fresh water. Id. at 3.
9. William G. Davis, Premier of the Province of Ontario, noted in 1984:
What many do not realize is that only one percent of the volume of water
in the Great Lakes is actually renewable through rain and snow. The rest
of the water is a gift built up over several thousands of years since the
glaciers receded. This volume of water cannot be replaced.
Davis, Durenberger & Matheson, Water for a Thirsty World-Are the Great Lakes in
Danger?, 1 GREAT LAKES REP. 8 (Sept.-Oct. 1984).
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cause a permanent drop in the level of the Lakes." A drop in the
level of the Lakes could seriously impair navigation and shipping on
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway system, as well as diminish
the supply of water available for use in the Lakes basin." Officials
in the Great Lakes region fear that the federal government'" may
plan diversions of water out of the Lakes to other regions, seriously
reducing the amount of water in the Lakes. 3 However, with co-
ordinated planning efforts by the officials in the Great Lakes region,
the region's water resources may be preserved; thus, the Great Lakes
basin may remain water-rich, 4 avoiding any future shortages.
Recently, many areas of the United States, particularly those
states in the West and Southwest, 5 have begun to be troubled by
water shortages. Compared to the East, much of the west receives
little precipitation." Yet the West is an important agricultural area, 7
10. Id.
11. Water Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B.A.J. 1066, 1067 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Water Wars Predicted].
12. An out-of-basin diversion from the Great Lakes would have to be under-
taken by the federal government, as the individual states which wish to receive the
water have no legal right to it. See infra note 31. The federal government could, if
there was sufficient support in Congress, include the Great Lakes under the Reclama-
tion Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. SS 371-600 (1983). This Act provides for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of works for the storage, diversion, and disbursement of
water for the arid lands in the West. By including the Great Lakes as a water source,
the Act could be used to form a massive, nationwide reclamation project, much larger
than the current regional projects. The federal government could also take control
of a diversion under the power granted by the Commerce Clause over navigable waters.
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3. See generally Comment, Great Lakes Water Diversion:
Federal Authority over Great Lakes Water, 1983 DET. COL. L. REV. 919 (1983) (discuss-
ing federal powers over the Great Lakes).
13. While it is impossible to predict exactly how much the level of the Lakes
would be affected before an actual diversion takes place, it should be noted that cur-
rent uses have already lowered the levels of the Lakes. For example, Lakes Huron
and Michigan have been lowered by one-quarter inch, while Lake Erie has been lowered
by four inches. Thus, it can be assumed that a significant diversion of water, in addi-
tion to current uses, would cause the levels of the Lakes to drop sharply. Great Lakes
Diversion, supra note 3, at 3.
14. It has been suggested that Great Lakes water will become a valuable
commodity, and that the Great Lakes region will become the "OPEC of water." Id. at 1.
15. These states are the states included in the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43
U.S.C. S 391 (1982). The Act names seventeen (17) states including: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
16. In the West, according to Scott Matheson, governor of Utah in 1984, "[aln
area of over one million square miles receives less than 20 inches of precipitation per
year-much of it forming snowpack that rapidly runs off during the spring. By con-
trast, the eastern United States averages 45 inches per year." Davis, Durenberger
& Matheson, supra note 9, at 9.
17. From 1973 to 1977, the West produced 55% of the fresh fruits and
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and the population of many western states is rapidly increasing. 8 To
provide the water necessary to support these increasing populations
and agricultural needs, water is "mined" from aquifers; 9 in other
words, water is pumped from the underground sources faster than
it can be replenished. The diminishing supply of groundwater has
caused pumping to become more difficult and more expensive.2 In
addition, huge cracks and fissures have appeared, and large areas of
ground have sunk or collapsed as the underground water beneath the
land has been drained away.' While experts disagree as to when the
water shortages will reach a crisis level," by the year 2000, if cur-
rent population and usage trends continue, much of the West will pro-
bably face serious water shortages. 4
vegetables marketed in the United States. In addition, the West produces grain and
livestock. Id. at 10.
18. For example, Nevada's population grew 65%, and that of Arizona, 53%
during the 1970s. Great Lakes Diversion, supra note 3, at 3. Recent Census Bureau
reports indicate that during the period between 1980 and 1983, the growth trend con-
tinued. During these years, the population of Nevada increased by over 11%; that
of Utah, over 10%; Texas, over 10%; Wyoming, over 9%; Arizona, 9%; Oklahoma,
9%; Colorado, over 8%; and New Mexico, over 7/o. Sun Belt Bulges with Population
Gain, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 22, 1984, S 1, at 16, col. 1.
19. An aquifer is an underground region of porous soil in which water is stored.
Boslough, Rationing a River, SCIENCE '81 26, 35 (June 1981).
20. "The aquifer is replenished as the Earth's crust, like a giant sponge, soaks
up rain and melting snows. But this is a slow process; some aquifer water is today
in the same place that it was 25,000 years ago." Id.
21. Frazier & Schlender, Running Dry: Huge Area in Midwest Relying on
Irrigation is Depleting Its Water, Wall Street J., Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
22. Schmidt, Demand for Water in Arizona Causing Deep Ground Cracks, N.Y.
Times, June 25, 1982, at Al, col. 5; Reinhold, Houston's Great Thirst is Sucking City
Down into the Ground, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, S 1, at 19, col. 1.
23. One writer explains:
Determining how long the water will last is complicated, too, and
the answer can vary from county to county-or even from well to well
on a single farm. In a few isolated areas, irrigation wells have already
gone dry or lost so much efficiency that farmers have reverted to dryland
farming. Other farmers measure their remaining water in terms of a few
years.
In the Texas high plains, irrigated acreage is expected to drop 45%
by the year 2000 even if conservation cuts water use by 20%. By then,
irrigation in western Kansas will have all but dried up, an Interior Depart-
ment study estimates. Nebraska officials worry about water mainly in
a few southwestern counties, however; they even predict that irrigation
will boom in some undeveloped areas where the Ogallala [the main aquifer
stretching under eight midwestern and western states] is especially thick.
Frazier & Schlender, supra note 21, at 1, 9.
24. Water Wars Predicted, supra note 11, at 1066; Davis, Durenberger &
Matheson, supra note 9, at 9; Boslough, supra note 19, at 35; Frazier & Schlender,
supra note 21, at 1, 9; Schmidt, supra note 22, at A10; Reinhold, supra note 22, at
19861
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The expected water shortage in the West has become a source
of concern for officials in the Great Lakes region. 5 As the largest
source of fresh water in North America, the Great Lakes may become
an attractive solution to the problem of a water shortage.' While there
are no immediate proposals for large-scale diversions out of the Great
Lakes basin, as a water crisis develops, diversions may be suggested.'
Although presently difficult to implement, a large-scale diver-
sion of water from the Great Lakes may occur. Such diversions are
technologically possible," but at this time they may be prohibitively
expensive.' In addition, current political pressures,' as well as legal
19. Contra Rogers, A Plentiful But Mismanaged Resource, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1982,
at 28, col. 3.
25. Malcolm, Great Lakes States Seek to Keep Their Water, N.Y. Times, June
13, 1982, S 1, at 30, col. 1 (reporting on a meeting, held by the governors of the Great
Lakes states and the premiers of the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, to
formulate regional policy).
26. Great Lakes Diversion, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
27. "Ideas suggested include building a pipeline from Lake Superior or tripl-
ing the flow of water from the Chicago Diversion to meet western water needs in
a variety of locations from the High Plains to California." Id. at 3.
28. The availability of the necessary technology is evidenced by the construc-
tion of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. See Comment, supra note 12, at 921 n.13. In addi-
tion, the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, completed in 1871, which diverts water
from Lake Michigan into the Mississippi River, demonstrates the availability of the
necessary technology.
[The Chicago Diversion] raises complex international legal questions and
in addition is a persistant irritant in Canadian-United States relations.
Moreover, it is intertwined in matters of domestic policy with states far
removed from the Great Lakes region interested in increasing the diver-
sion. The unique factor of the Chicago diversion is not the amount of water
involved, but the fact that the diverted water is not returned to the lake
but enters the Mississippi watershed. Thus the diversion represents a
withdrawal or net loss of water from the Great Lakes.
D. PIPER, supra note 4, at 90.
For a discussion of the building of the Chicago Diversion, see L. COOLEY. THE
DIVERSION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES BY WAY OF THE SANITARY AND SHIP CANAL
OF CHICAGO (1913); Herget, The Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal: A Case Study of Law
as a Vehicle for Managing Our Environment, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 285.
29. One estimate of a diversion from the west end of Lake Superior into the
Missouri River placed the cost of a 10,000 cfs (cubic feet per second) diversion at $26.6
billion. Davis, Durenberger & Matheson, supra note 9, at 8.
30. Five bills addressing interbasin transfers of water, three of which were
Great Lakes specific, were introduced in the 98th Congress. The texts of these bills
are reproduced in Diversions and Consumptive Uses of Great Lakes Water 1-20 (May,
1984) (unpublished information package, available from Great Lakes Commission, 2200
Bonisteel Blvd., Ann Arbor, MI, 48109) [hereinafter cited as Diversions and Consump-
tive Uses]. See also Taylor, Water: The Nation's Next Resource Crises?, U.S. NEws &
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 [1986], Art. 6
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obstacles,3 would make approval of a diversion difficult. As the popula-
tion continues to move to more arid regions and the water shortage
reaches crisis levels, political attitudes are likely to change and legal
obstacles may be more easily overcome. Thus, officials from the Great
Lakes states are formulating policies which would make a large-scale
out-of-basin water diversion difficult.
32
In addition, foreign policy-makers as well as domestic officials
are concerned with possible diversions from the Great Lakes. The
Lakes are international waters: one-third of the waters are within the
territorial boundaries of Canada.' Canadians fear a diversion from
the Great Lakes, since many of them depend upon the Lakes as their
greatest resource.' While Canadian officials are sympathetic to the
WORLD REP., 64, 64-68 (Mar. 18, 1985) (discussing the potential crisis facing the United
States due to pollution and consumption of water, and giving the views of several
senators and representatives).
31. There are two theories of water ownership used in the United States:
riparian ownership, followed primarily in eastern states, and prior appropriation, fol-
lowed primarily in western states. Under the riparian system, title to land bordering
a stream gives the holder a right to a reasonable beneficial use of the water, as long
as the use does not interfere with the rights of other riparian owners. United States
v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1944). Under the prior appropriation system,
one who first diverts water and puts it to a particular beneficial use has a right to
maintain that diversion for the duration of the use. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S.
423 (1931).
The western and southwestern states which would wish to receive waters from
a Great Lakes diversion are not riparian owners of the Lakes; thus, they have no
right to the water under riparian law theories. Nor do they have a right to the water
under the theory of prior appropriation, as they do not have any appropriations from
the Lakes. Therefore, under the two theories of water ownership followed in the United
States, riparian rights and prior appropriative rights, the western and southwestern
states have no legal right to Great Lakes water.
32. In addition to the bills pending in Congress, supra note 30, there are resolu-
tions and bills pending in several state legislatures. The states considering such bills
and resolutions are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The
texts of these bills and resolutions are reproduced in Diversions and Consumptive
Uses, supra note 30, at 26-57. These bills and resolutions clearly demonstrate the con-
cern with which lawmakers in the Great Lakes states view possible diversions from
the lakes.
Likewise, the governors of the Great Lakes states have demonstrated concern
over possible diversions from the Great Lakes. The Council of Great Lakes Governors
resolved, during a November, 1983, meeting to allow feasibility studies of diversions,
or actual diversions, only with the consent of the International Joint Commission and
each of the Great Lakes states. These resolutions led to a compact among the Great
Lakeq states, signed on February 12, 1985. Lakes Spawn Regional Cooperation, Post
Tribune, Feb. 20, 1985, at B2, col. 1.
33. D. PIPER, supra note 4, at 5.
34. One commentator contends:
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problems of a water shortage, it is doubtful that they would be will-
ing to agree to a diversion from the Great Lakes. 5 Canada's consent
to any diversion from the Great Lakes is necessary under the Boun-
dary Waters Treaty of 1909.'
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 was designed to settle
disputes between the United States and Canada over uses of boun-
dary waters. 7 The Treaty created the International Joint Commis-
sion as a mechanism with which to settle disputes and work out
agreements beneficial to both countries.' Thus, if either country
If to the United States the basin is important, to Canada, as a politically
and economically viable nation, it is indispensable. . . .[Tlhe position of
the Canadian part of the basin is more important to Canada than the
American sector is to the United States. If Canadians are a little less
detached than Americans about the seaway, levels of lake water, or freight
rates on and around the lakes, we can readily understand it.
Historically the basin is the heart of the Canadian nation in a way
that has never been true of the United States.
H. PINCUS, supra note 1, at 142.
Lowering the levels of the Great Lakes would have a significant economic im-
pact on Canadian interests. For example, it is estimated that a six-inch drop in the
surface levels of the Lakes would cost Canadians at least $20 million annually in hydro-
power generation, while each one-inch drop in water levels in the shipping channels
would reduce the amount of cargo shipped through the seaway system by a million
tons annually. In addition, lower water levels would necessitate the building of new
docks and the dredging of harbors. Wildlife and fisheries would suffer an adverse im-
pact as well. Davis, Durenberger & Matheson, supra note 9, at 8.
35. It has been the long-standing position of the Canadian government to op-
pose unilateral diversions from the Great Lakes basin. Address by David Lysne, Cana-
dian Consulate General, Chicago, to the Legislative Conference on Great Lakes Natural
Resources Management Issues, Chicago, June 8-9, 1984. (A summary of the proceedings
is available from the Center for the Great Lakes, see mailing address, supra note 2.)
As an example, Canada has objected to increasing the amount of water used in the
Chicago Diversion in a series of diplomatic notes. See 3 M. WHITEMAN. DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 789-805 (1964).
The Canadian position was repeated by William G. Davis, Premier, Province
of Ontario: "We are aware in Ontario of the growing interest in the southwestern
and midwestern United States to divert Great Lakes water to augment their sup-
plies. We realize these needs are real, but we simply cannot afford the economic con-
sequences of further diversions out of the Great Lakes basin." Davis, Durenberger
& Matheson, supra note 9, at 8.
36. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boun-
dary Waters Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910),
T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty], reprinted in Appendix.
37. Id. at preamble. For a discussion of the disputes leading to the Treaty,
and of the Treaty itself, see infra notes 40-94 and accompanying text.
38. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VII, reprinted in Appen-
dix. For an explanation of the International Joint Commission and its work, see infra
notes 95-131 and accompanying text.
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wished to divert water from the Great Lakes, it would have to receive
the consent of the Commission."
This note will explore the development of the relationship be-
tween the United States and Canada concerning the Great Lakes,
focusing on the Boundary Waters Treaty and the role of the Interna-
tional Joint Commission. It will then survey the development of in-
ternational water law, focusing particularly on the law of international
drainage basins. The note will then show how the Commission, if faced
with a proposal for a large-scale diversion out of the Great Lakes
basin, might use the principles of international water law to rule upon
a request for a diversion, and it will explore the probable results of
such a request.
HISTORY
The United States and Canada share a common border stretching
for more than 3,500 miles from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific." Of
this length, at least 2,000 miles are marked by navigable and non-
navigable lakes, rivers, and streams. 1 The use of these waters for
domestic and sanitary purposes, navigation, irrigation, and power pro-
duction has been a matter of concern to both nations. Controversies
over the uses of these waters frequently arose between Great Britain
and the United States, and between Canada and the United States."
39. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VIII, reprinted in Appendix.
40. The two nations also share a boundary between British Columbia, Yukon,
and Alaska, extending for approximately 1,450 miles, which is crossed by a number
of rivers. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (1958).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Great Britain ruled Canada until the early twentieth century. It
should be remembered that it was not until 1923 that Canada obtained
full powers in treaty-making. Until that time treaties were concluded by
the United Kingdom on behalf of the Dominion. Accordingly, many of the
conventional rules relative to the Great Lakes and Canadian-United States
relations in general were concluded with the United Kingdom and have
devolved upon Canada following its attainment of full political in-
dependence. Throughout the nineteenth century the United States ap-
parently took the position that since Canada did not enjoy full in-
dependence, the United States could not have any direct diplomatic rela-
tions with Canadian representatives. In this regard it is instructive to
mention a minor incident that occurred in 1895 regarding the formulation
of common rules of the road to govern navigation on the Great Lakes.
When differences arose over the substance of the rules, the British Am-
bassador suggested the advisability of "direct intercommunication between
1986]
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The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909," which created the International
Joint Commission,45 was the culmination of over a century and a quarter
of negotiations and treaties designed to avoid boundary controversies.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the primary con-
cern for both the United States and Britain in their boundary treaty
negotiations was to preserve their navigation rights in boundary
waters. The 1783 Treaty of Paris, the first to be concluded between
the parties, included an assurance of territorial jurisdiction over boun-
dary waters up to the boundary line for each party-nation, and opened
up navigation on the Mississippi River to citizens of both nations."6
This principle of free navigation for citizens of both nations was ex-
tended to all boundary waters by article III of the Jay Treaty of 1794.47
The Jay Treaty did not, however, grant a right of navigation by
foreign citizens on the non-boundary portions of the rivers. Thus,
American citizens did not have the right to navigate on portions of
the St. Lawrence River."5
the United States Government and the Canadian government." Secretary
of State Olney replied he has unable to regard the suggestion "as seriously
proposing that the Government of the United States shall enter into
diplomatic negotiations with the Dominion of Canada upon the subject
referred to." He was willing, however, to appoint experts to investigate
the matter and pave the way for negotiations through regular channels.
D. PIPER, supra note 4, at 6.
44. See supra note 36. This treaty was an important step in the development
of Canada's independent international status. While it was concluded with the United
Kingdom and signed by the British Ambassador, the Treaty was negotiated by a Cana-
dian, George Gibbons. D. PIPER, supra note 4, at 6-7.
45. The International Joint Commission represented the first time that Canada
had enjoyed equal status with the United States on a permanent international board.
It was also the first time that the British were not involved in Canadian-United States
relations. "To Gibbons and other Canadians the prospect of dealing directly with the
United States was welcome because it was believed that the United States would
no longer bully Canada once the British were out of the way." D. PIPER, supra note
4, at 7.
46. Treaty of Paris 1783, Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat.
80, 82 (1784), T.S. 104.
47. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116,
117 (1795), T.S. 105 (commonly referred to as the Jay Treaty).
48. An exception to this general prohibition on navigation by American ships
on the St. Lawrence River was granted to "small vessels trading bona fide between
Montreal and Quebec." Id. at art. III. This privilege was abrogated by the War of
1812. Thus, navigation on the St. Lawrence River as a whole remained in contention
for many years. Bourne, Canada and the Law of International Drainage Basins, in
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 468 (1974).
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Navigation of the entire St. Lawrence River was eventually
granted to American citizens by the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, in
exchange for permitting British ships open navigation on Lake
Michigan.'9 Although this treaty was terminated in 1866, the same
navigation rights were reestablished by the Treaty of Washington of
1871.1 That treaty also granted both parties navigation rights for the
full lengths of the Rivers Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine, which had
their sources in British territory but flowed through Alaska before
reaching the sea.' Thus, free navigation on boundary waters, a
primary concern for both Britain and the United States, was substan-
tially assured by 1871.
As free navigation became a settled question, the Americans and
the British focused their attention on other boundary issues. Advanc-
ing technology and a growing population led to increasing consump-
tive uses of the boundary waters." In addition, the boundary waters
became increasingly polluted, as these waters were a convenient dump-
ing place for the wastes of the cities located nearby." These com-
peting uses, as well as proposed and actual diversions of water by
both the Americans and the British, led to disputes between the two
nations over the boundary waters.' Both Britain and the United States
49. Treaty as to Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation in North America, June
5, 1854, 10 Stat. 1089 (1854), T.S. 124 (commonly referred to as the Reciprocity Treaty).
50. Treaty of Claims, Fisheries, Navagation of the St. Lawrence, etc.; American
Lumber on the River St. John; Boundary, May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863, 872 (1871), T.S.
133 (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Washington which calls for a settlement
of all differences between the two countries).
51. Id.
52. Consumptive uses are those which withdraw water from a lake or stream
and do not return the water to that lake or stream. Common consumptive uses in-
clude domestic uses, sanitation, industry, and irrigation. Bourne, supra note 48, at 469.
53. Id. The use of boundary waters as a dumping ground for sewage also
interfered with the use of these waters for recreation and hydro-electric power pro-
duction. Id.
54. For example, an early dispute occurred in 1841, when the waters of the
Allegash River in Maine were diverted from their natural course through a new canal
into the Penobscot River. The Allegash had previously flowed into the St. John River
and thus into Canada. Great Britain instructed its ambassador to protest the diver-
sion; however, as the impact of the diversion was insignificant, the matter was not
pressed further.
A more serious dispute occurred when the waters of the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers, which flow through Montana, Alberta, and Saskatchewan were diverted for
irrigation. Both the United States and Canada had made large diversions and were
proposing further withdrawals. The supply of water in the two rivers was inadequate
for all the uses both nations had planned. The two rivers became an issue of conflict
between the United States and Great Britain.
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began to feel that an established mechanism, which would not dir-
ectly involve the two governments, was necessary to settle these
water disputes equitably.5
The first substantial step towards establishing a mechanism for
settling disputes occurred at the International Irrigation Congress in
1895 when representatives of the United States, Canada, and Mexico
unanimously passed a resolution calling for the establishment of an
international commission.' This commission was to have the duty of
"adjudicating the conflicting rights which have arisen, or may arise,
on streams of an international character. ''"7 While the Canadian govern-
ment immediately approved formation of the commission, the British
government was unwilling to proceed at that time.58 Thus, it was not
until 1905 that the International Waterways Commission, the forerun-
ner of today's International Joint Commission, was formed.59
The two nations also had conflicting plans for diverting water at Niagara Falls
to generate hydro-electric power. While there was enough water for both nations to
utilize in generating power, a coordinated plan of use was needed to ensure that plans
of the two nations did not conflict.
Finally, the Chicago Diversion, which used water diverted from Lake Michigan
to carry away Chicago's sewage, was being built during the late nineteenth century.
This diversion, as proposed by the planners, would withdraw increasing amounts of
water from Lake Michigan, lowering the lake's surface level. Canadian and British
officials expressed concern over the amount of water being withdrawn from the lake.
Thus, as the boundary waters between the United States and Canada were
increasingly utilized for non-navigational purposes, the number of disputes between
the two nations about these uses also increased. Bourne, supra note 48, at 469-70.
55. Canada favored the establishment of a permanent commission for this pur-
pose, while the United States favored ad hoc commissions made up of politicians. Note,
A Primer on the Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint Commission, 51
N.D.L. REV. 493, 496 (1974) (discussing remedies under the Boundary Waters Treaty
for individuals injured by the Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota).
56. The International Irrigation Congress was held in Albequerque, New Mex-
ico. Its primary purpose was to discuss the effects of irrigation on the international
rivers of North America, and to propose solutions for the difficulties presented by
conflicting uses. Bourne, supra note 48, at 470.
57. This commission was to act in conjunction with the authorities of Mexico
and Canada to resolve disputes over conflicting rights. Id.
58. Id. In addition, the American Secretary of State informed the British am-
bassador that the United States could not implement in any way the wishes of Canada
to form a commission at that time. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD. supra note 40,
at 9.
59. In 1902, the United States Congress passed a Rivers and Harbors Act
which contained a provision requesting the President to invite the British govern-
ment to . ..
join in the formation of an international commission, to be composed of
three members from the United States and three who shall represent
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 [1986], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss2/6
1986] GREAT LAKES DIVERSION
The International Waterways Commission, composed of three
American representatives and three Canadian representatives, ac-
complished several tasks during its seven year existence. The Com-
mission investigated and reported on such subjects as the division
and diversion of waters on the Niagara River and the division of
waters at Sault Ste. Marie and at Chicago.' When, in 1906, it was
discovered that British and United States charts did not agree as to
the boundary line through Lake Erie, the matter was referred to the
Commission.' However, the Commission soon realized that it was
hampered by a lack of principles to guide its decisions and by an in-
adequate grant of powers to make decisions concerning the boundary
waters.2 Thus, the Commission recommended that a treaty be
negotiated between Britain and the United States and that a perma-
nent commission be set up to enforce the principles of this treaty. 3
The negotiations leading to the Boundary Waters Treaty were
difficult, as the Canadians and the Americans had conflicting goals.
The major difficulties in the negotiations centered on the establish-
ment of a mechanism for resolving disputes and on the possibilities
of unchecked diversions of boundary waters by their territorial
the interests of the Dominion of Canada, whose duty it shall be to in-
vestigate and report upon the conditions and uses of the waters adjacent
to the boundary lines between the United States and Canada, including
all the waters of the lakes and rivers whose natural outlet is by the River
St. Lawrence to the Atlantic ocean; also upon the maintenance and regula-
tion of suitable levels, and also upon the effect upon the shores of these
waters and the structures thereon, and upon the interests of navigation
by reason of the diversion of these waters from or change in their natural
flow; and further, to report upon the necessary measures to regulate such
diversion, and to make such recommendations for improvements and regula-
tions as shall best subserve the interests of navigation in said waters.
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902, ch. 1079, 32 Stat. 331, 373 (1902).
The Canadian government did not act on this proposal until 1905. L. BLOOM.
FIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 40, at 9-10.
60. Bourne, supra note 48, at 470-71.
61. D. PIPER, supra note 4, at 5.
62. The Commission was primarily an investigative body; its decisions on cases
before it were not considered final by the two nations. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZ-
GERALD. supra note 40, at 10.
63. The Commission made this recommendation in a 1906 report dealing with
the application of the Minnesota Canal and Power Company to divert certain waters
in Minnesota from the boundary area. The Commission recognized that it had an in-
adequate grant of power to decide the question. Thus, it recommended that another
commission be formed, which would have greater powers, and that a treaty be entered
into to "settle the rules and principles upon which all such questions may be peace-
fully and satisfactorily determined as they arise." Bourne, supra note 48, at 471.
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owners." The Canadians wished to establish a permanent commission
to deal with boundary problems as they arose, while the Americans
preferred ad hoc commissions with the authority to resolve only par-
ticular problems." Additionally, the Americans wanted to have the
Harmon Doctrine" incorporated into the treaty. This doctrine permit-
ted each state to do as it pleased with the waters within its territory,
regardless of possible damage to other riparian states. The Harmon
Doctrine exemplified an extremely nationalistic view of international
water law, which conflicted with established principles of international
law. 7 Conversely, the Canadians were in favor of following principles
64. Id.
65. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 40, at 11-12.
66. The Harmon Doctrine derives its name from an opinion issued by United
States Attorney General Judson Harmon in connection with a complaint by Mexico
charging interference with the flow of the Rio Grande by the United States in viola-
tion of international law. The opinion states, in part:
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty
of every nation, as against all others, within its own territory. Of the
nature and scope of sovereignty with respect to judicial jurisdiction, which
is one of its elements, Chief Justice Marshall said . . . :
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory
is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriv-
ing validity from an external source, would imply a diminu-
tion of its sovereignty to the extents of that restriction, and
an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that
power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power
of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to
the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances make
it possible or proper to take any action from considerations of comity
is a question which does not pertain to this Department; but that ques-
tion should be decided as one of policy only, because, in my opinion, the
rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no liability
or obligation upon the United States.
21 Op. Atty. Gen. 274, 281-83 (1895) (quoting Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 2 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 478 (1812)).
Thus, the Harmon Doctrine represents a theory of absolute territorial sover-
eignty, in which a riparian nation can freely use any or all of the waters of an interna-
tional river which flows within its territory. Other riparian nations have no right to
demand a continued flow of the river; likewise, the diverting state has no right to
a continued flow if the river passes through another nation's territory before passing
through the diverting nation's. Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 15, 18 (1967).
67. To establish the existence of a rule of international law, affirmative
evidence must be shown. Little concrete evidence has been found regarding the Har-
mon Doctrine. Lipper, supra note 66, at 22.
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which would permit either state to make diversions within its own
territory only to the extent that public or private interests in the
other state would not be injured. 8 Each side made concessions; thus,
the treaty as it was finally adopted provided for the establishment
of a permanent commission and incorporated the Harmon Doctrine.69
THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY OF 1909
The Boundary Waters Treaty proposed to enunciate the rights,
obligations, and interests of the United States and Canada in their
shared waters." The purpose of the Treaty was two-fold: 1) to settle
existing questions about the boundary waters;7" and 2) to provide a
mechanism for settling future disputes over the waters." To further
these purposes, the Treaty set forth solutions to specific disputes,
gave general principles to govern the settlement of future disputes,
and provided for the formation of the International Joint Commission
to settle disputes and questions. 3
The Treaty settled several troublesome questions involving con-
flicting uses of water by the two nations. Article V provided for the
diversion of specified amounts of water above the Falls on the Niagara
River by both the United States and Canada. 4 These diversions, which
were to be used by power plants licensed by the parties, had not
been regulated previously.7 5 It was a matter of concern for both coun-
tries that unregulated diversions would adversely affect the level of
Lake Erie and the stream flow of the Niagara River." The Treaty
provided both nations with a sufficient amount of water to divert for
power plants, while ensuring adequate levels in the lake and river.
The continuing dispute concerning the St. Mary and Milk Rivers was
settled by article VI, which provided that the two rivers be treated
as one for the purposes of irrigation and power.77 In addition, the ar-
ticle specified that the waters of the rivers were to be equally appor-
tioned between the two countries, designating specific amounts which
68. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 40, at 13.
69. The Treaty was signed at Washington on January 11, 1909, ratified by
both parties, and entered into force on May 5, 1910. Id.
70. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at preamble, reprinted in Appendix.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at articles V, VI, VII, and VIII.
74. The United States was authorized to divert a daily amount of not more
than twenty thousand (20,000) cubic feet of water per second (cfs), while Canada was
authorized to divert a daily amount of not more than thirty-six thousand (36,000) cfs.
Id. at art. V.
75. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
76. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. V, reprinted in Appendix.
77. Id. at art. VI.
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could be diverted as well as providing for periodic measurement and
reapportionment. Finally, article II provided that all other uses,
obstructions, and diversions which had existed prior to the Treaty
would be allowed to continue."8 Thus, the Boundary Waters Treaty
achieved the first of its stated purposes: settling existing questions
concerning boundary waters.
The Treaty also presented principles to settle future questions
over the boundary waters. First, those waters to be considered "boun-
dary waters" were defined in the preliminary article."9 Next, article
I reaffirmed that navigation on all navigable boundary waters, Lake
Michigan, and all canals connecting boundary waters, would "forever
continue free and open" for inhabitants of both countries.2 Article
II contained a statement of the Harmon Doctrine,8 which Canada had
reluctantly allowed to be included. Thus, article II allowed each coun-
try to retain exclusive jurisdiction and control over diversions and
uses within its own territory; however, each party also reserved the
right to object to any interference with or diversion of water by the
other which would produce "material injury"82 to navigational in-
terests.' Finally, articles III and IV provided that neither country
should make any obstruction or diversion of waters which would
materially affect the natural level or flow of boundary waters of the
78. Article II provides a cause of action for citizens of one country injured
by a use of the boundary waters by the other nation in the offending nation's courts.
Expressly excluded from this provision, and, thus, from the scope of the Treaty are
"cases already existing or cases expressly covered by special agreement between the
parties hereto." Id. at art. II. Thus, the Chicago Diversion was excluded.
79. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at preliminary article, reprinted
in Appendix.
80. This right of free navigation is subject to any laws and regulations which
either country might make. However, these laws must be "not inconsistent with such
privilege of free navigation and applying equally and without discrimination to the
inhabitants, ships, vessels, and boats of both countries." Id. at art. I.
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In the Treaty, the Doctrine
is stated as:
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several
State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Govern-
ments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions
now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control
over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters
on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow
across the boundary or into the boundary waters. . ..
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. II, reprinted in Appendix.
82. "Material injury" is not defined in the Treaty; it would seem that what
constitutes material injury could vary from case to case.
83. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VII, reprinted in Appendix.
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other country, including any raising of those levels, without the
authorization of both the United States and Canada and the approval
of the International Joint Commission.' These principles were general
guidelines for the International Joint Commission to follow; such
general guidelines were to aid in accomplishing the second purpose
of the Treaty: avoiding future disputes.
Perhaps the most important step which the Boundary Waters
Treaty took to avoid future disputes was to set up the International
Joint Commission. The Commission, authorized by article VII, con-
sists of six members, three from each country. 5 Article VIII granted
the Commission jurisdiction over cases involving the use of, or the
obstruction or diversion of, boundary waters, where such uses would
affect the levels or flows of the waters." This article also set out the
principles which the Commission was to follow in reaching its deci-
sions: 1) the contracting parties were to have equal and similar rights
in the use of the waters; 2) certain uses were to be preferred over
others;87 3) the equal division requirement was to be temporarily
suspended when, in the Commission's opinion, such suspension was
necessary; 4) conditioning approval and/or requiring the posting of an
indemnification bond was within the discretion of the Commission; and
5) decision of the Commission was to be by majority vote.8 Thus, the
Commission, given the necessary jurisdiction and guidelines of deci-
sion, was set up as a judicial body to settle future disputes.
The Commission was granted more than mere adjudicative
powers by the Treaty. Article IX grants the Commission investigative
powers for questions referred by the two governments.89 The ad-
ministrative powers of the Commission are granted by article VI."°
84. Article III provides for obstructions and diversions which lower the level
or flow of the boundary waters, while article IV provides for dams and remedial works
which raise the level of the waters. In addition, article IV states that boundary waters
"shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."
Id. at articles III and IV.
85. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VII, reprinted in Appendix.
86. Id. at art. VIII.
87. The order of uses given is: 1) for domestic and sanitary purposes; 2) for
navigation, including the service of canals for the purposes of navigation; and 3) for
power and irrigation purposes. Id.
88. Id.
89. These questions may be referred by either government or by the two
governments jointly. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
90. Article VI grants the Commission the power to act as an administrative
board, overseeing the use of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers. See infra notes 117-19
and accompanying text.
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Article X grants the Commission a further type of power: that of
an arbitral body in case of disagreement between the two nations.91
These arbitral, administrative, and investigative powers were tailored
to give the Commission enough authority to resolve any boundary
questions which might arise, thus helping to further the Treaty's goal
of avoiding disputes.
The remaining articles of the Treaty are procedural. Article XI
specifies that all the Commission's decisions and reports must be
rendered with copies for each government.' Article XII gives the Com-
mission the power to choose meeting places, hold meetings, appoint
secretaries, administer oaths to witnesses, take evidence, and to adopt
such procedure as is necessary. 3 Finally, article XIII provides that
special agreements between the United States and Canada must be
approved by the Congress and Parliament. Thus, the Boundary
Waters Treaty provides the International Joint Commission with the
necessary procedures to settle disputes, as well as giving it the powers
to do so.
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 has proven effective in
reaching its stated purposes and goals. Then existing boundary ques-
tions were settled, and, through the work of the International Joint
Commission, other disputes have been avoided. In the decades follow-
ing the ratification of the Treaty, the Commission has played an im-
portant role in managing the boundary waters, including the Great
Lakes.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
The International Joint Commission, formed under the authoriza-
tion of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, began operations in 1912.
The Commission consists of six members, three Canadians and three
Americans. The Commission is directed by Canadian and American
91. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
92. In addition, the article directs that all communication of the Commission
to the governments shall be through the Secretary of State of the United States and
the Governor General of Canada. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. XI,
reprinted in Appendix.
93. Article XII also provides that the salaries of the Commissioners and their
secretaries shall be paid by their respective governments, while joint expenses of the
Commission shall be divided between the two governments. Id. at art. III.
94. These special agreements include concurrent or reciprocal legislation by
Congress and the Parliament. Id. at art. XIII.
95. The Canadian Commissioners are appointed by the Governor in Council,
while the American Commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 1980 INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ANN. REP. 5
[hereinafter cited as 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP.].
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Co-Chairmen, who serve full-time, while the other Commissioners serve
part-time." The Commission maintains two offices: one in Ottawa, the
other in Washington, D.C." The Commissioners act as a unitary body,
not as representatives of the governments. 8 Thus, they attempt to
arrive at impartial solutions which will benefit both nations, while
carrying out their duties as a judicial, investigative, administrative,
and arbitral body.
Under the jurisdiction granted by the Boundary Waters Treaty,
the International Joint Commission functions predominantly as a quasi-
judicial body.9 In practice, the workings of the Commission closely
resemble those of an administrative agency. Generally, the Commis-
sion takes jurisdiction over an application submitted by either govern-
ment. ' Notice of hearings is published in newspapers, and written
notice is sent to all parties involved."0 ' All hearings are open to the
public.' 2 Time is provided for counsel to submit briefs. '3 Testimony
need not be under oath, but the opportunity for cross-examination
is mandatory.' 4 The Commission decides questions as to the ad-
missibility of evidence.' °5 The Commission then uses general principles
96. Id.
97. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION RULES OF PROCEDURE. 22 C.F.R. S 401.4
(1984) [hereinafter cited as I.J.C. R.P.]. In addition, there is a regional office located
in Windsor, Ontario, which is responsible for assisting the Commission in administer-
ing the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95,
at 5.
98. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 5.
99. Jordan, The International Joint Commission and Canada-United States Boun-
dary Relations, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
523, 526 (1974).
100. The application may be by the government itself, or may be on behalf
of a private citizen. A private person must request his or her government to make
an application to the Commission. I.J.C. R.P., supra note 97, at S 401.6(b). An American
citizen, for example, applies to the Secretary of State.
After applying to the Secretary of State, an applicant may concentrate
on preparing for the hearing ultimately to be held on his application. The
actual filing of the application with the Commission is done by the
Secretary of State, and the Commission itself gives notice to the other
government and to interested parties, schedules and gives notice of a
hearing.
Waite, The International Joint Commission-Its Practice and Its Impact on Land Use,
13 BUFF. L. REV. 93, 103 (1963) (discussing what is necessary for a planner to make
a presentation to the Commission regarding a proposed development on a lakeshore).
101. I.J.C. R.P., supra note 97, at S 401.9.
102. Id. at S 401.23.
103. The time period in which to submit briefs is thirty days, after which thirty
days is provided for reply briefs to be submitted. Id. at S 401.10-401.11.
104. Id. at SS 401.23(e)-401.23(f).
105. Id. at SS 401.23(g)-401.23(h).
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of international law, as well as the guidelines given in the Boundary
Waters Treaty, in reaching its decisions."6
Once the Commission has rendered a decision, its conditions are
binding on all parties involved, including both governments.' 7 The
Commission usually appoints an international board of control to
oversee compliance with its conditions.0 0 Thus, the Commission is
assured that the decisions which it reaches in carrying out its judicial
function under the Boundary Waters Treaty are enforced.
The second function of the Commission under the Boundary
Waters Treaty is that of an investigative body. The Commission is
authorized to examine and report upon questions received from the
two governments."° These questions have usually been referred jointly
by the two governments, after consultation on the terms of the re-
quest.' The Commission then appoints a board, usually consisting of
engineers, scientists, and others from government agencies who have
expertise in the areas to be investigated."' The board investigates
the matter"2 and reports back to the Commission, which makes the
reports public and holds hearings to gather comments on the reports."3
After holding these public hearings, the Commission draws together
the board's reports and any findings from the hearings to formulate
its recommendations, which are submitted to both governments. 4 Im-
106. D. PIPER, supra note 4, at 81.
107. Id.
108. Among these boards of control are those overseeing projects on the St.
Lawrence River, Niagara River, Lake Superior, St. Croix River, Rainy Lake, Lake
of the Woods, Stouris River, St. Mary-Milk Rivers, Kootenay River, Osoyoos River,
Skagit River, and Lake Champlain. In addition, the Commission has appointed Pollu-
tion Advisory Boards for the St. Croix River, Rainy River, and Red River. 1980 I.J.C.
ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 42.
109. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. IX, reprinted in Appendix.
110. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 6. Article IX, however, allows
either party to request an investigation by itself. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note
36, at art. IX, reprinted in Appendix.
111. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 6-7. This practice has been met
with approval by at least one commentator. See Waite, supra note 100, at 100 ("Using
personnel of existing government agencies avoids creation of a new bureaucracy with
its attendant risk of hobbling, interbureau rivalries.").
112. The subsidiary board's work is not public. "The board, once appointed,
works unobtrusively, without public hearings, possibly to free them from public pressure.
The principle of protecting advisory boards from public pressure is long established
in international practice." Note, supra note 55, at 504.
113. Id; 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP,, supra note 95, at 7.
114. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 7.
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plementation of the Commission's recommendations on these refer-
rals by the respective governments is not compulsory."5 Generally,
the governments implement the Commission's recommendations after
bilateral consultation. " ' The investigative function of the International
Joint Commission has enabled the two governments to explore ques-
tions which would be difficult for either government to explore alone,
thus strengthening cooperation between the United States and Canada.
The International Joint Commission was given a third function
by the Boundary Waters Treaty, that of an administrative body. The
Treaty specifically gives the Commission the duty to measure and
apportion the waters of the Milk and St. Mary Rivers and sets out
rules for it to follow.1 " In addition, later treaties and agreements have
given the Commission the responsibility of management over other
sections of the boundary waters. "8 The Boundary Waters Treaty itself,
however, gave the Commission only a limited administrative function.1 9
In what could almost be termed a residuary clause of the Boun-
dary Waters Treaty, article X grants the International Joint Com-
mission an arbitral function.'" This is clearly not a mandatory func-
tion for the governments to use; indeed, this arbitral function has
never been used during the seventy-three year history of the Com-
mission."'2 Article X states that the governments may jointly refer
any question or dispute to the Commission for a binding decision.
Under the wording of article X, it appears that such a referral may
be on any subject and need not concern the boundary directly. 2 ' If
115. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. IX, reprinted in Appendix.
116. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 6.
117. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
118. For example, the Commission was given administrative jurisdiction over
the Lake of the Woods in 1925. Treaty between Canada and the United States to
Regulate the Level of the Lake of the Woods, Feb. 24, 1925, 44 Stat. 2108 (1925), T.S.
721. Later agreements gave the Commission administrative jurisdiction over other boun-
dary rivers and lakes. For a listing of the boards created by these agreements see
supra note 108.
119. In it, the Commission was given administrative jurisdiction only over the
St. Mary and Milk Rivers. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. IX, reprinted
in Appendix.
120. Id. at art. X.
121. 1980 I.J.C. ANN, REP., supra note 95, at 6.
122. This conclusion can be drawn from the lack of restrictive words in this
article. "In defining the arbitral jurisdiction of the Commission, Article X does not
contain the restrictive words 'along the common frontier' used in defining the in-
vestigative jurisdiction of the Commission under Article IX." L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZ-
GERALD, supra note 40, at 55.
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the Commissioners are unable to reach a decision, the matter must
then be referred to an umpire for a decision in accordance with the
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes.'2 While the two governments seem unwilling to commit
themselves to such binding arbitration,"' article X remains as an op-
tion for the governments, through the International Joint Commis-
sion, to use in settling disputes.
The International Joint Commission, with its adjudicatory, in-
vestigative, administrative, and arbitral powers, is a unique body
created by the Boundary Waters Treaty. It enjoys a broad mandate
of power and significant freedom from political interference.' The
Commission created a mechanism by which disputes could be settled
without the direct involvement of either government; thus, it aided
in avoiding confrontations between the governments. The Commis-
sion has had an impressive record of success. In only a few instances
has it been deadlocked or has it failed to provide a settlement to a
dispute."6 Through its recognition of common goals and problems for
both countries, the International Joint Commission has aided in the
development of the boundary regions.
123. Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779 (1900), T.S. 392.
124. One writer speculates, "It appears that neither country wishes to bind
themselves to a procedure that might work to their disadvantage. For Article X to
have any 'teeth' it would have to make arbitration possible at the request of one of
the countries, not both." Note, supra note 55, at 505.
125. As one commentator has stated:
The commission, whether applying rules established by the Boundary
Waters Treaty or formulating principles for co-operative action, brings
to bear techniques and practices that would be difficult to duplicate in
the traditional institutions of diplomatic intercourse. It not only ensures
a degree of continuity and consistency in dealing with a series of similar
problems but also because of its detachment from political involvement,
achieves an important element of objectivity in evaluating the issues in-
volved in each case. As a result, matters that might otherwise exacer-
bate the relations between Canada and the United States are dealt with
in an informed and dispassionate manner calculated to ensure a full con-
sideration of the interests of both nations.
Jordan, supra note 99, at 539.
Contra McDougall, The Development of International Law with Re.spect to Tran.-
Boundary Water Resources: Co-operation for Mutual Advantage or Continentalism's Thin
Edge of the Wedge?, 9 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 261 (1971) (contending that the Commission's
rulings are often politically biased and work to the advantage of the United States).
126. In the 1948 Waterton and Belly Rivers Reference, studies were completed,
but the Commission divided on national lines in making a recommendation, and only
the Canadians reported to their government. I.J.C. Docket No. 57, Waterton and Belly
Rivers, 1948.
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The International Joint Commission, with its system of two na-
tions working together to develop guidelines for the use of a common
area, has also presaged the development of international water law.
The law of international drainage basins'27 has gradually developed
from nationalistic ownership policies into a system of regional coopera-
tion for the development of entire basins.'28 In addition, the rule of
equitable apportionment'" in the use of common waters has gradually
developed into an international rule."3 As international waters, the
Great Lakes are governed by general customs of international law,
as well as by the Boundary Waters Treaty."' Thus, an understanding
of the principles of international water law is necessary for the deter-
mination of possible results in a dispute involving the Great Lakes.
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
Several basic trends have emerged in the rapidly developing area
of international water law."3 2 These trends include: consulting with
co-riparian nations before beginning water projects which will affect
The Commission was also unable to reach decisions in two references having
to do with the Columbia River. I.J.C. Docket No. 51, Columbia River (1944) and I.J.C.
Docket No. 69, Libby Dam and Reservoir (1954) both led to stalemates between the
two nations. For a discussion of the Columbia River controversy, see Martin, Interna-
tional Water Problems in the West, in CANADA-UNITED STATES TREATY RELATIONS 51
(D. Deener ed. 1963).
127. An international drainage basin has been defined as "a geographical area
extending to or over the territory of two or more states and is bounded by the water-
shed extremities of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters,
all of which flow into a common terminus." Olmstead, Introduction in THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 1, 4 (1966).
128. See infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 166.
131. The International Joint Commission applies principles of international law
in its decision-making roles. D. PIPER. supra note 4, at 81. In addition, the actions
of the Commission have contributed to the formation of international water law, as
the former chairman of the United States delegation has pointed out. "[Tihe Commis-
sion has enunciated interpretations and views which represent modest but indepen-
dent evolution of international legal principles." Sugarman, The International Joint
Commission and Principles of International Law, in COMMON BOUNDARY/COMMON PROB-
LEMS 48 (1981).
132. International water law has changed and developed as water has been
put to new uses. Until recently, the main use of most waterways was for navigation;
thus. most treaties concerning shared waterways provided for navigational rights. See
supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text for examples of navigational treaties be-
tween the United States and Great Britain. As population grew and technology
developed, however, consumptive uses of international waterways increased. Rivers
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them; planning the development of drainage basins through interna-
tional or joint commissions instead of nations acting individually; and
dividing available water for use among nations by the principles of
equitable apportionment. An examination of the traditional sources
of international law,'33 such as treaties and conventions,
3 4 
custom, 135
which had been used primarily for navigation were needed to provide water for cities
and industries as well as for increased irrigation and sanitation needs. Nations which
had made little use of shared waterways began diverting and consuming large amounts
of water. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT. INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (1980).
As co-riparian nations extended their consumptive uses, those uses began to affect
other nations' possible uses. It became apparent that new principles governing uses
of international waters would be necessary to avoid conflicts. Id.
133. The sources of international law, as listed in the statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, are:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles recognized by civilized nations;
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. 993.
134. Treaties and conventions are law for the parties to the treaties; in addi-
tion, they may be used as evidence of general international law.
That existing general international law in a given field may be traceable
to the rules of a universally or virtually universally adhered to "law-
making" multilateral treaty is known to all. It is usually conceded that
such "international legislation" makes a quite direct contribution to general
international law. In addition, a widely adhered to treaty might openly
purport to be merely, or primarily declaratory of the existing customary
law. Such formal codification or restatement may be limited legally speak-
ing to the role of "some evidence" in the process of the proof of the law;
however, sociologically speaking, the individual and collective state ac-
tivity that brought forth the declaratory treaty is itself state practice,
reinforcing (in this instance) the customs -not just providing proof of them.
Even bilateral agreements can serve these functions of evidencing and
strengthening the customary rules, by manifesting the intention of the
framers to affirm, on the whole, the existing law.
Hayton, The Formation of the Customary Rules of International Drainage Basin Law,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 834, 861-62 (1967).
135. Custom in international law has a meaning which differs from its mean-
ing in ordinary usage.
Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or usage;
it is a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one. There
must be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form
of sanction will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the transgressor.
Evidence that a custom in this sense exists in the international sphere
can be found only by examining the practice of states; that is to say,
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judicial decisions,3 ' and the writings of publicists,'37 shows that these
concepts are becoming a part of general public international law.
The obligation to consult with co-riparian nations before begin-
ning a project which would affect shared waters has become widely
recognized during the twentieth century. This obligation ensures that
a state will not utilize the waters of an international drainage basin
without examining all the factors involved. By consulting with other
states, a nation may discover another course of action which is more
beneficial to all the parties affected, or, at the very least, ascertain
the legal ramifications of its proposed actions." While international
law requires consultation and good faith negotiation with co-riparian
states, there is no duty to accept terms proposed by other states,' 9
nor is there a duty to reach an agreement. 0 However, consultation
and negotiation will strengthen a nation's position in an adjudication
we must look at what states do ... and attempt to understand why they
do it, and in particular whether they recognize an obligation to adopt
a certain course or, in the words of Article 38 [of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice], we must examine whether the alleged custom
shows "a general practice accepted as law."
J. BRIERLY. THE LAW OF NATIONS 59-60 (6th ed. 1963).
136. These decisions may be those of national courts or of the International
Court of Justice.
Decisions and opinions by courts and quasi-judicial bodies of a particular
state frequently are the most accessible and legally sufficient manifesta-
tions of that state's legal position on many technical international or foreign
relations matters and are often resorted to.
• . . International tribunal "precedent" and legal grounds announced by
international tribunals for their decisions may themselves be admissible
as some evidence of customary state practice, at least in the absence of
widespread state criticism of, or objection to the Court's or other tribunal's
formulations.
Hayton, supra note 134, at 845, 854.
137. Publicists' writings are used in international law to identify recognizable
trends. As international law has no legislation and little codification, the works of
scholars have been accepted as a source of evidence of the law.
The actual influence of any given writer aside, what justifies use of com-
mentators . . . is the assistance their works can render in analysis of
the problem, in making available more of the voluminous, equivocal and
inaccessible record of state practice, and in articulating concisely the
recognized or developing legal principles and rules involved.
Id. at 860.
138. Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins:
The Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212, 230 (1972).
139. Id. at 233.
140. Id. at 231.
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over a proposal, as the nation will have demonstrated good faith.'
Thus, the obligation to consult with co-riparian nations before im-
plementing a proposal for water utilization has been a useful develop-
ment in international water law.
The obligation to consult with co-riparian states can be seen in
treaties, conventions, judicial decisions, and publicists' writings.' Of
the over 250 treaties on the non-navigational uses of international
rivers compiled by the Secretariat of the United Nations,' 3 almost
half included some type of provision for negotiation or agreement
before the development of the basin is undertaken.' The International
Court of Justice, in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration,"' and the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases,'.6 has held that an obligation to consult
and negotiate arises out of customary international law.'47 Many noted
publicists agree.'48 Thus, the obligation to consult with co-riparian
states before undertaking a development project can be found in the
traditional sources of international law.
The use of an international or joint commission in the planning
and development of international basins has also gained acceptance
141. Id. at 227.
142. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
143. United Nations Legislation Series, Legislation, Texts and Treaty Provi-
sions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Naviga-
tion, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.
144. Sixteen treaties contain an explicit provision to consult and negotiate, eigh-
teen treaties contain provisions whereby the parties undertake to solve water disputes
by agreement, and eighty contain provisions promising not to make changes in the
regime of the basin without the consent of the other party. Id.
145. (France v. Spain) 1957 Int'l L. Rep. 101.
146. (Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Neth., Fed. Reg. of Ger. v. Den.) 1969 I.C.J. 3.
147. In Lake Lanoux, the Court concluded:
International practice reflects the conviction that States ought to strive
to conclude . . . agreements: there would thus appear to be an obligation
to accept in good faith all communications and contacts which could, by
a broad comparison of interests and by reciprocal good will, provide States
with the best conditions for concluding agreements.
1957 Int'l L. Rep. at 129-30.
Likewise, in the North Seu Continental Shelf Cases, the Court found that the
parties were under an obligation to negotiate with a view to arriving at an agreement
delimiting areas of the North Sea continental shelf. 1969 I.C.J. 1 at 46-47, 53-54.
148. Bourne, supra note 138; H.A. SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS 152-53 (1931); Sevette, Legal Aspects of Hydro-Electric Development of Rivers
and Lakes of Common Interest, U.N. Doc. No. E/ECE/136, at 211 (1952); Griffin, Legal
Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, Memorandum of the State Depart-
ment, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1958).
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as a part of international law. While the structure of these commis-
sions varies with the drainage basins involved,"9 the commissions share
some common characteristics. Among these characteristics are: the
authority to undertake studies or investigations; the ability to make
advisory decisions or recommendations to the governments involved;
long-term or indefinite duration; members who are usually engineers
or other professionals; and jurisdiction which covers the entire basin
within the territories of the member nations.'" These international
commissions are designed to facilitate development of the shared
basins by making investigation of potential projects easier, as well
as providing a mechanism for the nations involved to consult with
each other before development. 15 Thus, protests and delays may be
avoided. In addition, once the development of a basin is completed,
the international commission may be used as an administrative board
empowered to oversee the river system.5 ' International commissions
have eased problems involved in the development and administration
of international basins; thus, these commissions have gained accept-
ance in customary international law.
The growing acceptance of international commissions as a
mechanism for shared basin development can be seen by the increasing
number of treaties and conventions which provide for such commissions,
as well as by the support given them by publicists. While only two inter-
national commissions administering shared river systems existed before
1900," almost two dozen such commissions have been created since then.15 4
149. As publicists have stated, "IN]o two rivers are alike, and ... the social,
economic and political environments within each river basin impose different demands
on organization for development." Ely & Wolman, Administration, in THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 124, 146 (1967).
150. Id. at 137.
151. Id.
152. For example, the Commission for the Iron Gates Project, formed by a
1956 agreement between Romania and Yugoslavia, provides for a "mixed commission"
to oversee the planning, construction, and operation of a development project on the
Danube. Id. at 127.
153. The European Commission on the Danube was created by treaty in 1815.
The present parties to the treaty are Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Austria, Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R., and the Ukraine. Id. at 126.
The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine was created in 1816. The
present members are France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Belgium, and Great Britain. Id. at 127.
154. A partial listing of these commissions includes: the International Joint
Commission, United States and Canada, created in 1909; the International Commission
for the Elbe River, Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1919; the Frontier Water Commis-
sion, Denmark and Germany, 1922; the Kunene River Commission, Portugal and South
1986]
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In addition, both the Helsinki Rules'55 and the Institute of International
Law Resolution of 19611" recommend that joint commissions be created
in international water basins. The United Nations Water Conference'57
adopted similar recommendations, calling for the establishment of joint
committees of cooperation between co-riparian states.'- Several publicists
have stressed the importance of joint commissions, calling for their
establishment in basins which do not have plans for cooperative develop-
ment.1 5'9 Thus, the trend is toward the creation of international commis-
sions to plan, develop, and administer international basins.
Africa, 1926; the Douro River Commission, Spain and Portugal, 1927; the International
Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 1944; the Roya River
Commission, France and Italy, 1952; the Committee for Coordination of Investigations
of the Lower Mekong Basin, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, 1957; the Per-
manent Joint Technical Commission (Nile River), Republic of Sudan and United Arab
Republic, 1959; the Permanent Indus Commission, India and Pakistan, 1960; the In-
tergovernmental Committee for the Senegal River Basin, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania,
and Senegal, 1963; the River Niger Commission, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Dahomey,
Guinea, Upper Volta, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, 1964; and the Commission of the Lake
Chad Basin, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, 1964. Id. at 128-33, 147 n.1. For a
discussion of the workings of these and other joint commissions, see generally Kenwor-
thy, Joint Development of International Waters, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 592 (1960).
155. Article 31 of the Helsinki Rules recommends "that the basin States refer
the question or dispute to a joint agency and that they request the agency to survey
the international drainage basin and to formulate plans or recommendations for the
fullest and most efficient use thereof in the interests of all such States." Helsinki Rules
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, International Law Association, Report
of the Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki (1966) [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
156. Article 9 of the Resolution states, "It is recommended that States interested
in particular hydrographic basins investigate the desirability of creating common organs
for establishing plans of utilization designed to facilitate their economic development
as well as prevent and settle disputes which might arise." Resolutions Adopted by
the Institute of International Law at its Session at Salzburg, Article 9 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Salzburg Resolutions].
157. The Water Conference was held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, during March,
1977. 31 U.N.Y.B. 553 (1977).
158. The Conference recommended . . .
that in situations in which countries lay upstream or downstream from
one another on a river, bordered on a common lake or exploited a ground-
water reserve extending into their neighbour's territory, they should
establish joint committees, as appropriate and by agreement, to co-operate
[sic] in such areas as data collection, management, pollution control, disease
prevention, flood and drought control, and river improvement. In the
absence of an agreement on how to use shared resources, countries which
shared them should exchange information on which the future manage-
ment of these resources could be based, to avoid future foreseeable
damages.
31 U.N.Y.B. 553, 557-58 (1977).
159. Ely & Wolman, supra note 149, at 146; Kenworthy, supra note 154; Fox
& Craine, Organizational Arrangements for Water Development, 2 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1962);
Ostrom, The Water Economy and its Organization, 2 NAT. RES. J. 55 (1962).
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Another trend emerging in international water law is the use
of the principles of equitable apportionment in the division of shared
waters. Equitable apportionment, or equitable utilization, recognizes
the equality of right of co-riparian nations; in other words, the theory
of equitable apportionment recognizes that riparian nations have an
equal right to use shared waterways in accordance with their needs.'60
Equitable apportionment of a shared waterway calls for a determina-
tion of the rights of each nation involved by either negotiation and
agreement' or third-party tribunal.' 2 In determining each nation's
equitable share of a common water system, several factors must be
considered: 1) each nation's right to a "reasonable" use of the water;
2) each nation's dependence on the waters of that particular system;
3) the comparative gains to each nation, and the entire riparian com-
munity, by a proposed use; 4) the existing agreements between the
nations concerned; and 5) any pre-existing appropriations by the
nations involved.' 3 By weighing these factors, a determination of the
most equitable use of the shared waters of a particular system may
be made. Equitable apportionment is not a static doctrine; uses and
rights will vary from one river system to another'" and may change
in one river system over a period of time.'65 However, equitable ap-
portionment, with its balancing of factors for each river system, has
160. In explanation, one commentator states:
What is the concept of equality of right? It means in the first place, that
all states riparian to an international waterway stand on a par with each
other insofar as their right to utilization of the water is concerned. Fac-
tors unrelated to the availability and use of the waters are irrelevant
and should not be considered. For example, the size of a particular state
in relation to a co-riparian or the fact that the river flows for a greater
distance through one state than another is not in itself a factor to be
considered in determining what is an equitable utilization ....
Lipper, supra note 66, at 44-45.
161. This appears to be the most common, and preferred, method of determin-
ing rights. See 31 U.N.Y.B. 553, 557 (1977); Salzburg Resolutions, supra note 156, at
articles 6. 7; Scott, Kansas v. Colorado Revisited, 52 Am. J. INTL L. 432, 454 (1958).
162. Resort to a third-party tribunal, either through arbitration or adjudica-
tion, is recommended if negotiations become deadlocked. See HeLsinki Rules, supra note
155, at art. 34; Salzburg Resolutions, supra note 156, at art. 8; Laylin, The Role o/
Adjudication in International River Disputes, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 30 (1959).
163. These factors were originally formulated by the International Law Associa-
tion at its Dubrovnik Conference in 1956. The factors are discussed in some detail
in Lipper, supra note 66, at 42-44.
164. Uses and rights will vary as co-riparian nations in different basins may
be at different stages of development; thus, they have different uses for available
water. Id. at 63.
165. As Lipper points out, "Nor is the determination of an equitable utiliza-
tion final for all times. Changing circumstances may require revaluation and a new
determination." Id. at 66.
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led to a system of determining rights which has become a part of
international law. 1
66
International water law is composed of concepts that are evolv-
ing to suit the new uses to which international waterways are sub-
mitted. The previous strong nationalistic and territorial concepts of
riparian ownership, suitable when waterways were used primarily for
navigation, became inappropriate as consumptive water uses in-
creased."6 7 New concepts were needed to allow maximum beneficial
use of shared waterways with a minimum of detrimental impact on
each riparian nation. Thus, the obligation to consult with co-riparian
states before beginning development of waterways, the use of joint
commissions to develop and administer waterways, and the equitable
apportionment of shared waterways were adopted into international
law. These concepts are also dynamic; each changes to suit a particular
water system at a particular time. These flexible concepts allow in-
ternational water law to adapt to new uses of waterways.
166. The adoption of equitable apportionment as a rule of international law
is apparent in treaties, conventions, customs, and judicial opinions. There are dozens
of treaties regulating the use of boundary waters which limit the rights of the
signatories in respect to one another and expressly recognize the equality of right
of the parties. Examples of such treaties include those between Italy and Switzerland,
Sept. 17, 1955, 291 U.N.T.S. 213 (1958); Iraq and Iran, July 4, 1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 241
(1938); Russia and Estonia, Feb. 2, 1920, art. XVI, Annex (2), 11 L.N.T.S. 29, 46 (1922).
For a more complete listing of such treaties, see Lipper, supra note 66, at 70-71 n.31.
In addition, multilateral conventions, such as the 1923 Geneva Convention, provide
for apportionment based on equality of right. Convention of Geneva Relating to the
Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, 36
L.N.T.S. 75 (1925). As evidence of the existence of a perceived international custom,
governmental pronouncements since the mid-nineteenth century have acknowledged
the existence of equality of right and the consequent duty to apportion waters equitably.
See Lipper, supra note 66, at 25-28. International tribunal adjudications, while relatively
few in number, have also recognized the principles of equitable apportionment. See
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 1957, Int'l L. Rep. 101; International Com-
mission of the River Oder Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23 (1929). Finally, United States
Supreme Court, which applies principles of international law when deciding cases be-
tween states, has applied equitable apportionment when deciding interstate water rights.
Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539 (1982) (principles of equitable apportionment
apply between states disputing water rights); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1931) (both states have real and substantial interests in the Delaware River which
must be reconciled); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (on demurrer), 206 U.S.
46 (1907) (on merits) (the right to use water flowing across state lines must be ad-
justed on the basis of equality of rights between states). Thus, an examination of the
sources of international law leads to the conclusion that equitable apportionment is
a principle accepted in international law.
167. See supra note 132.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 [1986], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss2/6
1986] GREAT LAKES DIVERSION
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is an important document
in international water law, as it contained early statements of the
flexible concepts of the law. The Treaty illustrates the obligation to
consult with co-riparian nations before beginning development of
shared waters, as both parties to the Treaty are required to inform
the International Joint Commission, and each other, of any proposed
plans.' " The use of an international commission to plan, develop, and
administer a shared waterway is clearly present in the Treaty's In-
ternational Joint Commission;169 indeed, the Commission was one of
the first of such international bodies formed. 7 ' While the Treaty's in-
corporation of the Harmon Doctrine may seem to violate the prin-
ciples of equitable apportionment,'"' the Treaty also provides that both
parties have "equal and similar" rights in the boundary waters.' In
practice, the Harmon Doctrine as incorporated in article II has never
been applied; the United States repudiated the doctrine as contrary
to international law when Canada attempted to invoke article II in
the Columbia River dispute. 3 Thus, it appears that the Treaty's state-
ment of the parties' equal and similar rights predominates. Clearly,
168. The approval of the Commission is necessary to begin any development
of the boundary waters. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
169. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VII, reprinted in Appendix.
170. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
171. The Treaty's statement of the Harmon Doctrine is contained in article
II. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
172. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. II, reprinted in Appendix.
173. The Columbia River dispute arose when the United States and Canada
proposed mutually exclusive plans for the portions of the Columbia basin within each
nation's territory. In 1955, the Chairman of the Canadian Section, General McNaughton,
asserted that the Canadian development plans were within the scope of the Harmon
Doctrine as incorporated in article II of the 1909 Treaty. In replying through the
American Chairman, Len Jordan,
The United States Department of State took the position that Article
II was merely a restatement of customary international law and that the
latter rejected absolute sovereignty and embraced limited sovereignty;
further, the Department denied that the Harmon Doctrine has ever been
a part of international law, rejecting it as a prime example of "special
pleading."
Lipper, supra note 66, at 26.
Negotiations over the Columbia River were stalled for several years. Finally,
a solution was reached wherein Canada allowed part of its territory to be flooded
by American dams in return for receiving electricity from downstream power pro-
jects. A treaty dealing specifically with the development of the Columbia River was
drafted and signed in 1961. Martin, supra note 126, at 51.
For a more detailed discussion of the Columbia River controversy, see Austin,
Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of In-
ternational Rivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37
CAN. B. REV. 393 (1959); Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 CAN. B. REV. 444
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the Boundary Waters Treaty stands as an early statement of the
trends of contemporary international law.
The Boundary Waters Treaty and international water law pro-
vide principles to guide the International Joint Commission in mak-
ing a decision on any proposed development in the Great Lakes. Thus,
if the United States were to propose a diversion out of the Great
Lakes17 to benefit the west and southwest, the Commission would
grant or deny the proposal on the basis of the Treaty and interna-
tional law. The Treaty also gives the Commission different and
separate roles in which to function in ruling on a proposal, depending
on the manner in which the proposal is referred to the Commission.
The next section will examine how the Commission might act in its
investigative, adjudicative, and arbitral roles175 in applying the prin-
ciples of the Treaty and customary international law to a proposed
diversion.
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION IN A PROPOSED DIVERSION
The United States and Canada have a mechanism for settling
disputes over diversions from boundary waters in the International
Joint Commission. Thus, if the United States proposed to divert water
from the Great Lakes, the matter would go before the Commission.
The proposal to divert water could go before the Commission in one
of three ways: as an investigative referral, as an adjudicative refer-
ral, or as an arbitral referral. In any type of a reference, the Com-
mission would apply the principles of international law; yet, because
of the difference between the types of references, those principles
would be applied differently and could lead to disparate results. Each
type of reference, with its benefits and detriments, must be considered
to determine which type of reference would allow the Commission
to render a decision beneficial to both nations. In addition, the alter-
native of bypassing the Commission by direct negotiation between
the United States and Canada must also be considered. Such direct
negotiation could lead to a new treaty between the two nations deal-
ing specifically with diversions from the Great Lakes. In this way,
the most beneficial method of settling a dispute over large-scale diver-
sions from the Great Lakes can be determined.
(1959); Cohen, Some Legal and Policy Aspects of the Columbia River Dispute, 36 CAN.
B. REV. 25 (1958).
174. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
175. A diversion proposal would not involve the Commission in its administrative
role, as the Commission only takes administrative jurisdiction over a project once it
has been approved and development begun. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying
text.
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Either the United States or Canada may refer a matter to the
Commission for investigation under article IX, 7" although past refer-
rals have usually been made by the two governments acting jointly.177
In an investigative referral, the jurisdiction of the Commission is
limited to an examination of the question referred. This examination
is followed by a report and recommendation on the matter to the
government or governments which made the referral."' The Commis-
sion may take no action beyond investigation unless requested to do
so, and its decisions or recommendations are not binding.9 In con-
ducting an investigation, the Commission may appoint boards and com-
mittees of professionals and other individuals, who have expertise in
the matter referred, to study the proposal."' Thus, the Commission
has the discretion to conduct investigations in the manner best suited
for the particular referral, but once the investigation is completed,
its findings are not binding on the parties.
After receiving an investigative referral from Canada and the
United States, concerning a diversion from the Great Lakes, there
are several steps which the Commission would take. First, it would
establish a subsidiary board to investigate the diversion proposal. The
board would probably consist of engineers, 81 scientists," economists,"
and lawyers,8 ' drawn from both governments, to study a diversion
plan in all its aspects. After making its investigations," the subsidiary
board would report back to the Commission. The Commission would
then make the board's report public, and hold public meetings in a
number of locations around the Great Lakes area.8 In order to form-
176. Article IX allows a referral by "either the Government of the United States
or the Government of the Dominion of Canada." Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note
36, at art. IX, reprinted in Appendix.
177. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 6.
178. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. IX, reprinted in Appendix.
179. Id.
180. 1980 I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 6-7.
181. Engineers would study the technological feasibility of a proposed diversion.
182. Scientists would be appointed to study the environmental impacts of a
proposed diversion.
183. Economists would be necessary to study the financial and economic im-
pact of a proposed diversion, both on the Great Lakes region and on the region which
would receive the water.
184. Lawyers would probably be appointed to determine whether such a diver-
sion is within the scope of the federal government's power, and thus permissable under
United States law, and whether the diversion is permissable under international law.
185. The work of the subsidiary board would not be public. See supra note 112.
186. It is probable that this proposal would be considered controversial; thus,
several of these meetings, held in various locations, would be necessary to gather
a representative number of opinions from the public.
1986]
Reinumagi: Diverting Water From the Great Lakes:  Pulling the Plug on Canada
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
330 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
ulate its recommendations, the Commission would evaluate the opi-
nions voiced by the public and the reports of the subsidiary board."'7
A situation such as a proposed diversion from the Great Lakes to
the southwest, which would benefit only the United States, would
likely divide the Commission along national lines, although the Com-
mission has split this way only twice in the past. '88 If the Commission
disagrees, both sides' opinions may be given to both governments,
or each side may submit its recommendations to its own government.'89
Thus, after an investigative referral of a Great Lakes diversion pro-
posal, the Canadian and American governments could receive one
recommendation from the entire Commission, two conflicting recom-
mendations from a split Commission, or one recommendation from part
of a split Commission.
An investigative referral to the Commission is clearly not the
best method of settling a dispute over a diversion from the Great
Lakes. While an investigation is useful for researching the benefits
and detriments of a proposal, this type of referral does not lead to
a final decision on the matter. In this function, the Commission acts
as an advisory board, making recommendations to the two govern-
ments. This advisory function is an important one; an investigative
referral has been used as a preliminary step in deciding at least one
past controversial water use proposal.'9 ° Yet, an investigative refer-
ral cannot lead to a decision by the Commission under the terms of
the Boundary Waters Treaty. Thus, such a referral is most useful
as a preliminary step toward decision-making through another means
by the Commission.
One means by which the Commission may be allowed to make
a decision on a diversion proposal is through an adjudicative referral.
The Commission, in carrying out this function, closely resembles an
administrative agency.'9 ' Canada and the United States would not be
adversarial parties before the Commission,'92 but merely parties seek-
187. This is the Commission's usual procedure in an investigative referral. 1980
I.J.C. ANN. REP., supra note 95, at 7.
188. See supra note 126. The splits occurred over the Waterton and Belly River
Reference, and at two points during the Columbia River References.
189. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. IX, reprinted in Appendix.
190. A 1944 investigative reference was a first step in the seventeen-year pro-
cess of dispute and negotiation leading to the Columbia River Treaty. I.J.C. Docket
No. 51, Columbia River (1944). See also Austin, supra note 173, at 435.
191. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
192. One writer has suggested the reason that parties appearing before the
Commission are styled as adversaries is because the courtroom model was the only
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ing a determination of their respective rights in the Great Lakes. The
Commission would use the principles given by the Boundary Waters
Treaty and international water law, namely equitable apportionment
principles, ' a in determining each nation's rights in the Great Lakes.
Under the Treaty, such a decision by the Commission is final and
binding on the parties involved;'94 thus, the Commission in its ad-
judicative capacity can provide a final settlement to a dispute over
Great Lakes' water diversions.
In an adjudicative referral, the Commission would hear each
party's arguments as to its rights in an out-of-basin diversion from
the Great Lakes. In proposing such a diversion, the United States
may raise several arguments, under the Treaty and under the general
principles of international law. Under the Treaty itself, the United
States may argue that: 1) article III does not permit the Commission
to interfere with the ordinary use of boundary waters for domestic
and sanitary purposes, thus, as this diversion will be for domestic
and sanitary purposes, the Commission may not interfere; 2) as
domestic and sanitary purposes have the highest priority under arti-
cle VIII, a diversion for these purposes should also be given high
priority; and 3) while both countries have equal and similar rights
in the boundary waters, article VIII grants the Commission discre-
tion to suspend the equal division requirements, and, in a situation
of acute water shortage in one nation, the requirement should be
suspended. Under the principles of equitable apportionment, the
United States may argue that: 1) each country has the right to a
"reasonable" use of shared waters, and, as a diversion to ameliorate
an acute water shortage in one country must be considered reasonable,
the use should be allowed; 2) as water supplies in other parts of the
country dwindle, the United States has come to depend on the Great
Lakes to a greater extent, and thus should be allowed a greater use
of the water; 3) the social and economic gains in allowing a diversion
would be great, as a diversion to the Southwest would allow the
system with which the drafters of the Treaty were familiar. As administrative law
was not yet highly developed in the early twentieth century, the drafters had no model
of non-adversarial adjudication upon which to draw. In present practice, the Commis-
sion has tended towards nonadversarial, rather than courtlike, proceeding. Note, supra
note 55, at 501-03.
193. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
194. As one commentator points out, "[T]he Commission is in effect a final court.
Only the agreement of both countries can override its decision." La Forest, Boundary
Water Problems in the East, in CANADA-UNITED STATES TREATY RELATIONS 28, 36 (D.
Deener ed. 1963).
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agriculture, industries, and cities now located there to continue to
exist and flourish; and 4) as the United States has a prior appropria-
tion from the Lakes,' at the very least, it should be allowed to in-
crease the amount of water appropriate to meet its increased needs.
These arguments would establish the American position, in hearings
before the Commission, that the United States has a right and a need
to make a diversion.
To refute the American arguments of having a right to make
a diversion, Canada would claim paramount rights in the Great Lakes.
Under the Treaty, Canada would argue that: 1) an out-of-basin transfer
of water has never been considered, and is not, an ordinary use of
water, and thus does not fall under article III; 2) while article VIII
accords domestic and sanitary uses highest priority, Canada also uses
the Great Lakes for such purposes, and these uses would be harmed
by a diversion; 3) article VIII allows a suspension of the equal and
similar water rights only for temporary diversions, not for perma-
nent diversions such as the one proposed; and 4) article VIII provides
for equal and similar rights between the parties, thus, a use which
benefits one party and harms the other must not be permitted. Canada
may also make arguments under equitable apportionment that: 1) as
to each party having the right to a reasonable use of shared waters,
an out-of-basin transfer of large amounts of water on which Canada
depends for much of its livelihood can scarcely be considered
reasonable; 2) while the United States has other actual and potential
sources of water," Canada depends almost entirely on the Great Lakes
to support much of its population's needs; 3) Canada's social and
economic structure depends heavily on the Great Lakes to support
its industry and its largest cities; and 4) while a prior diversion by
the United States exists, it is relatively small, and neither party has
provided for its enlargement. Thus, Canada could argue that the
United States has no right under either the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 or international law to make a large-scale diversion from the
Great Lakes. Indeed, as such a diversion would be to Canada's detri-
ment, Canada could argue that it has the right to prevent a diversion.
Having heard the arguments of both Canada and the United
States, the Commission could come to a decision on the merits of the
195. Illinois maintains the Chicago Diversion, which is an appropriative use.
See supra note 28.
196. Actual sources of water include diversions from rivers entirely within the
United States, such as the Snake River or the Missouri--Mississippi River systems.
One potential source would be desalinization of Pacific Ocean water. Conservation must
also be considered as a source of water. Davis, Durenberger & Matheson, supra note
9, at 10.
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nations' claims. Under the Boundary Waters Treaty, the right to divert
water from the Great Lakes would probably fail. The right to divert
water out-of-basin has not been held to be an ordinary use in the
past,'97 and the use of boundary waters for out-of-basin domestic and
sanitary purposes was probably not a use contemplated by the
Treaty. 98 In addition, as the proposal would probably be for a perma-
nent diversion, the Commission would not be authorized to suspend
the "equal and similar rights" requirement of article VIII." Thus, the
arguments of the United States under the Treaty would fail.
Likewise, the United States would probably fail on its interna-
tional law arguments. Equitable apportionment requires a balancing
between the competing interests of nations. In this instance, a water
crisis in the United States would be balanced against Canada's
dependence on the Great Lakes. While diverting water from the Lakes
may be the most convenient solution for the United States, other solu-
tions to a water shortage would probably be available.00 The conven-
ience to the United States would not outweigh the detriment to
Canada. Under the principles of equitable apportionment, the United
States would probably not be allowed to divert large amounts of
water."1
A referral to the Commission in its adjudicative role, in which
the principles of international law must be applied relatively strictly,
would lead to the final settlement of a dispute over the Great Lakes.
There is no provision for an appeal from the Commission's decision
in an adjudication; 2 thus, the only recourse to an adverse decision
would be to ignore it. This, of course, would be a violation of the
197. Indeed, when the issue arose in the context of Canada's wishing to divert
water out-of-basin during the Columbia River dispute, the United States protested
that an out-of-basin diversion was an unreasonable use of boundary waters, not a nor-
mal or ordinary use. On this. point, the Commission apparently agreed with the United
States. Lipper, supra note 66, at 27.
198. As the level of technology at the time the Treaty was drafted would not
allow a large-scale out-of-basin diversion for any purpose, the drafters probably did
not contemplate such a use.
199. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VIII, reprinted in Appen-
dix. As the proposed diversion would be permanent, and the amount of water available
for use on the other side would be diminished, the diversion would not fall within
the discretionary suspension of the equal division requirement by the Commission.
200. See supra note 196.
201. The United States might be allowed to increase its prior appropriation
at Chicago, but only to the extent that Canada's interests would not be harmed.
202. Article VIII does not provide any type of appeal from a majority opinion
of the Commission. If the Commissioners are deadlocked, however, the article states
that each side is to report to its own government. The two governments then shall
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Treaty."3 As nations generally do not wish to violate international
law," 4 the United States would probably try to abide by the Commis-
sion's decision. Thus, an adjudication would be beneficial to Canada,
but not beneficial to the United States as a whole."'5 To reach a deci-
sion beneficial to both parties, a different function of the Commission
must be used.
A reference to the Commission, calling for a compromise between
the two parties, could be made under its function as an arbitral body.
A reference to the Commission for arbitration must be made jointly
by the two governments. This reference, or compromis d'arbitrage6
must contain the question or questions which the Commission is to
consider. The compromis may also contain the rules of law which the
parties have agreed are to govern the decision, as well as an agree-
ment as to whether the Commission may consider the matter ex ae-
quo et bono, °7 foregoing rules of law if necessary. Under article X of
the Treaty, the decision of the Commission is final and binding, but,
"endeavor to agree upon an adjustment of the question or matter of difference." No
provision is made for a situation in which the governments are unable to agree. Boun-
dary Waters Treaty, supra note 36, at art. VIII, reprinted in Appendix.
203. This would not necessarily terminate the Treaty, as one publicist has shown.
Mere breach by a party does not of itself terminate a treaty. But it may
give to another or to the other parties a right to consider it at an end.
Alternatively, it may give a right to that other or those others to sus-
pend performance on their part; or it may provide a justification for some
other form of retaliatory action. Further it may, and perhaps in all cases
does, constitute the basis of a legal claim to reparation, monetary or
otherwise.
Parry, The Law of Treaties, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 175, 239 (M.
Sorenson ed. 1968).
204. As one author explains, "Nations recognize that the observance of law
is in their interest, and that every violation may also bring particular undesirable
consequences. It is the unusual case in which policymakers believe that the advan-
tages of violation outweigh those of law observance, or where domestic pressures compel
a government to violation ....... L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 320-21 (1979).
205. Officials in the Great Lakes states would probably consider a denial of
a diversion proposal to be beneficial to the region. See supra notes 10-28 and accom-
panying text.
206. The compromis d'arbitrage is an agreement between the parties to an ar-
bitration, which contains a statement of the exact question to be settled, as well as
an indication of the method of constituting the arbitral tribunal. In addition, the com-
promis generally contains the rules of law and procedure which the tribunal is to follow
in reaching its decision. International Law Commission, Model Rules on Arbitral Pro-
cedure, Art. 2, 2 I.L.C.Y.B. 83 (1958).
207. The term, as used in international law, means to settle a dispute equitably,
in disregard, if necessary, of existing law. Sorensen, Latin Terms, in MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW lvii (M. Sorenson ed. 1968).
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if the Commission is unable to render a decision, the matter will be
referred to an umpire chosen by the parties. 8 Thus, an arbitral
reference would provide a final decision in a dispute over a Great
Lakes diversion, as well as provide an alternate means of settlement
in case of an impasse.
In an arbitral reference, the Commission's actions are governed
by the terms of the compromis given it by the governments. Thus,
if the compromis allows the Commission to consider the proposal ex
aequo et bono, the Commission may give the weight it considers
necessary to the severity of the water shortages in the United States.
It may give these shortages more consideration than a strict inter-
pretation of the doctrine of equitable apportionment would allow. The
Commission may also consider concessions which the United States
would be willing to make in exchange for a water diversion,'" if the
compromis allows such consideration. A compromis can allow con-
siderable flexibility in dealings between the two nations, as rules of
law need not be strictly followed. Thus, in an arbitral reference, the
United States could be allowed a limited diversion from the Great
Lakes, which would not cause too great an injury to Canada's interests,
if Canada were willing to accept benefits in exchange.
An arbitral reference to the Commission allows a flexibility and
balance in decision-making which is not available to the Commission
in its other functions. Arbitration also provides a mechanism for the
settlement of disputes if the Commission is unable to reach a deci-
sion. The matter could be referred to an umpire, who would be a
neutral third party,10 to provide a resolution. In addition, the ability
to consider concessions given in other areas in reaching a decision
allows the Commission a flexibility to render a decision beneficial to
both the United States and Canada.
While using the Commission to render a decision concerning boun-
dary waters is perhaps the most obvious solution to a dispute involv-
ing a diversion from the Great Lakes, the option of direct negotia-
208. The umpire is to be chosen in accordance with the Hague Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. See supra note 123.
209. Among the concessions which the United States might consider offering
are controlling acid rain and other trans-boundary pollution to a greater extent, or
favoring Canada in trade and tariff practices. Another possibility is monetary
compensation.
210. Under the terms of the Hague Convention, the parties to the arbitration
choose an umpire together, and are thus ensured of the umpire's acceptability. Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. XXXII, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1793 (1900), T.S. 392.
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tions between the two governments must also be considered. Negotia-
tion leading to a treaty is a common method of international dispute
resolution.21' It allows flexibility between the parties: they are free
to change their positions if a change is advantageous. Negotiation be-
tween diplomats or statesmen representing each government brings
the governments into direct contact with each other, and is espec-
ially useful when a new treaty or agreement is necessary."'
In the case of a proposed diversion from the Great Lakes,
however, a treaty covering the situation and a Commission with ex-
pertise in the area already exists. The Boundary Waters Treaty was
concluded, and the Commission formed, so that further dispute set-
tlement need not take place between the two governments directly.213
It was felt that the interests of both nations would be best served
by a joint board which would be relatively free of governmental and
political interference. Free of such political concerns, the Commission
has generally made settlements which are in the best interests of both
nations.21' In direct negotiation, political interests are important, as
each nation attempts to gain as much as possible for itself. In addi-
tion, direct negotiation tends to be time-consuming, while the Com-
mission has generally made its decisions relatively quickly. Thus, while
direct negotiation is an option, it may not be the most beneficial op-
tion for both nations.
'The International Joint Commission can be used to settle a
dispute over a diversion from the Great Lakes, making direct negotia-
tion between Canada and the United States unnecessary. In its various
functions, the Commission may serve the interests of the two nations
differently. In its investigative role, the Commission may gather the
information necessary to delineate the matters involved in the dispute,
but cannot make a binding decision in the matter. Thus, its investiga-
tions may be, at best, a preliminary step in dispute settlement. In
211. Murty, Settlement of Disputes, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
674, 679 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968).
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
214. One writer claims:
No difference has arisen that has not yielded to amicable solution; no in-
stance has arisen in which one tried to outmanuever the other; no hard
bargains have been sought and no sharp practices have fettered the sense
of fairness that has prevailed. The principle of reasonableness and of
friendly co-operation has been the guiding star.
Hackworth, General Aspects of Canadian-United States Treaty Relations, in CANADA -
UNITED STATES TREATY RELATIONS 123, 124 (D. Deener ed. 1963).
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an adjudicative role, the Commission may come to a binding decision,
but it must apply the principles of international law relatively strictly.
This would put the United States into a weak position, as a diversion
of the magnitude necessary to provide water for arid areas would
not be possible under traditional international water law. A solution
in which the rules of law may be modified somewhat to balance con-
cessions given in other areas is called for.
In an article X arbitral referral, the Commission may modify legal
rules somewhat, if the compromis of the reference allows such
modification. Thus, a compromis which would allow a limited diver-
sion to occur in exchange for concessions given elsewhere might be
most beneficial to both parties, while allowing the least harm to oc-
cur to each party. While this is not a perfect solution,"' an arbitral
award in which each side receives benefits may be the best possible
solution.
Yet the United States should consider its options carefully before
planning diversions from the Great Lakes. The Lakes are a valuable
resource for the United States as well as for Canada. As they are
nonrenewable resources, which support shipping, industry, and
agriculture, as well as provide water for several cities, a large-scale
diversion may do harm to the United States' interests, as well as
Canada's interests. Thus, the United States should consider other op-
tions for providing water to its arid areas before diverting water from
the Great Lakes.
CONCLUSION
A proposal for a diversion from the Great Lakes has the poten-
tial to become a source of controversy between the United States
and Canada. While historically there has been controversy between
the two nations concerning the use of their boundary waters, these
disputes were largely settled by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
The Treaty set up the International Joint Commission as a mechanism
for settling disputes concerning boundary waters and gave the Com-
mission powers of adjudication, investigation, administration, 'and
arbitration.
215. Canada may refuse to arbitrate under article X. If Canada chose not to
arbitrate, but instead chose to continue to attempt to prevent a diversion, the United
States could be left facing a water shortage with no remedy except to make diver-
sions in violation of international law.
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On a referral from the two governments, the Commission could
settle the question of a diversion from the Great Lakes by adjudica-
tion or arbitration. Because it calls for a strict application of interna-
tional water law and the Boundary Waters Treaty, adjudication would
not be advantageous to the United States; a large-scale diversion
benefitting only one nation would not be possible under these prin-
ciples. Arbitration, as provided for under the Boundary Waters Treaty,
is probably the best method of settling a dispute over Great Lakes
water diversions, as it provides both an opportunity for compromise
and a final determination of each nation's rights. In an arbitral award,
the United States might be permitted to make a diversion, if it is
willing to give concessions in return. Thus, arbitration would seem
to be the best method of settling a dispute over a diversion from
the Great Lakes.
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APPENDIX
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
RELATING TO BOUNDARY WATERS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA, January 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548. The
United States of America and His Majesty the King of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions
beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, being equally desirous to prevent
disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all ques-
tions which are now pending between the United States and the Domi-
nion of Canada involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either
in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their
common frontier, and to make provisions for the adjustment and settle-
ment of all such questions as may hereafter arise, have resolved to
conclude a treaty in furtherance of these ends, and for that purpose
have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States of America, Elihu Root,
Secretary of State of the United States; and
His Britannic Majesty, the Right Honorable James Bryce, O.M.,
his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington;
Who, after having communicated to one another their full powers,
found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:
PRELIMINARY ARTICLE
For the purposes of this treaty boundary waters are defined as
the waters from the main shore of the lakes and rivers and connect-
ing waterways, or portions thereof, along which the international boun-
dary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes,
including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof, but not including tributary
waters which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes,
rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing across the
boundary.
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties agree that the navigation of all
navigable boundary waters shall forever continue free and open for
the purposes of commerce to the inhabitants and to the ships, vessels,
and boats of both countries equally, subject, however, to any laws
and regulations of either country, within its own territory, not incon-
sistent with such privilege of free navigation and applying equally
and without discrimination to the inhabitants, ships, vessels, and boats
of both countries.
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It is further agreed that so long as this treaty shall remain in
force, this same right of navigation shall extend to the waters of Lake
Michigan and to all canals connecting boundary waters, and now ex-
isting or which may hereafter be constructed on either side of the
line. Either of the High Contracting Parties may adopt rules and
regulations governing the use of such canals within its own territory
and may charge tolls for the use thereof, but all such rules and regula-
tions and all toll charges shall apply'alike to the subjects or citizens
of the High Contracting Parties and the ships, vessels, and boats of
both of the High Contracting Parties, and they shall be placed on
terms of equality in the use thereof.
ARTICLE II
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the
several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Pro-
vincial Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any
treaty provisions now existing in respect thereto, the exclusive
jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary
or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their
natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary
waters; but it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from
their natural channel of such waters on either side of the boundary,
resulting in any injury to the other side of the boundary, shall give
rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same
legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such
diversion or interference occurs; but this provision shall not apply
to cases already existing or to cases expressly covered by special,
agreement between the parties hereto.
It is understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting
Parties intends by the foregoing provision to surrender any right,
which it may have, to object to any interference with or diversions
of water on the other side of the boundary the effect of which would
be productive of material injury to the navigation interests on its own
side of the boundary.
ARTICLE III
It is agreed that, in addition to the uses, obstructions, and diver-
sions heretofore permitted or hereafter provided for by special agree-
ment between the parties thereto, no further or other uses or obstruc-
tions or diversions, whether temporary or permanent, of boundary
waters on either side of the line, affecting the natural level or flow
of boundary waters on either side of the line, shall be made except
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 [1986], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss2/6
GREAT LAKES DIVERSION
by authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada within
their respective jurisdictions and with the approval, as hereinafter
provided, of a joint commission, to be known as the International Joint
Commission.
The foregoing provisions are not intended to limit or interfere
with the existing rights of the Government of the United States on
the one side and the Government of the Dominion of Canada on the
other, to undertake and carry on governmental works in boundary
waters for the deepening of channels, the construction of breakwaters,
the improvement of harbors, and other governmental works for the
benefit of commerce and navigation, provided that such works are
wholly on its own side of the line and do not materially affect the
level or flow of the boundary waters on the other, nor are such pro-
visions intended to interfere with the ordinary use of such waters
for domestic and sanitary purposes.
ARTICLE IV
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except in cases pro-
vided for by special agreement between them, they will not permit
the construction or maintenance on their respective sides of the boun-
dary of any remedial or protective works or any dams or other
obstructions in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters
at a lower level than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boun-
dary, the effect of which is to raise the natural level of the waters
on the other side of the boundary unless the construction or
maintenance thereof is approved by the aforesaid International Joint
Commission.
It is further agreed that the waters defined herein as boundary
waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted
on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.
ARTICLE V
The High Contracting Parties agree that it is expedient to limit
the diversion of waters from the Niagara River so that the level of
Lake Erie and the flow of the stream shall not be appreciably af-
fected. It is the desire of both parties to accomplish this object with
the least possible injury to investments which have already been made
in the construction of power plants on the United States side of the
river under grants of authority from the State of New York, and on
the Canadian side of the river under licenses authorized by the Domi-
nion of Canada and the Province of Ontario.
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So long as this treaty shall remain in force, no diversion of the
waters of the Niagara River above the Falls from the natural course
and stream thereof shall be permitted except for the purposes and
to the extent hereinafter provided.
The United States may authorize and permit the diversion within
the State of New York of the waters of said river above the Falls
of Niagara, for power purposes, not exceeding in the aggregate a daily
diversion at the rate of twenty thousand cubic feet of water per
second.
The United Kingdom, by the Dominion of Canada, or the Pro-
vince of Ontario, may authorize and permit the diversion within the
Province of Ontario of the waters of said river above the Falls of
Niagara, for power purposes, not exceeding in the aggregate a daily
diversion at the rate of thirty-six thousand cubic feet of water per
second.
The prohibitions of this article shall not apply to the diversions
of water for sanitary or domestic purposes, or for the service of canals
for the purposes of navigation.
ARTICLE VI
The High Contracting Parties agree that the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers and their tributaries (in the State of Montana and the Pro-
vinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan) are to be treated as one stream
for the purposes of irrigation and power, and the waters thereof shall
be apportioned equally between the two countries, but in making such
equal apportionment more than half may be taken from one river and
less than half from the other by either country so as to afford a more
beneficial use to each. It is further agreed that in the division of such
waters during the irrigation season, between the 1st of April and 31st
of October, inclusive, annually, the United States is entitled to a prior
appropriation of 500 cubic feet per second of the waters of the Milk
River, or so much of such amount as constitutes three-fourths of its
natural flow, and that Canada is entitled to a prior appropriation of
500 cubic feet per second of the flow of the St. Mary River, or so
much of such amount as constitutes three-fourths of its natural flow.
The channel of the Milk River in Canada may be used at the
convenience of the United States for the conveyance, while passing
through Canadian territory, of waters diverted from the St. Mary
River. The provisions of Article II of this treaty shall apply to any
injury resulting to property in Canada from the conveyance of such
waters through the Milk River.
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The measurement and apportionment of the water to be used
by each country shall from time to time be made jointly by the pro-
perly constituted reclamation officers of the United States and the
properly constituted irrigation officers of His Majesty under the direc-
tion of the International Joint Commission.
ARTICLE VII
The High Contracting Parties agree to establish and maintain
an International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada
composed of six commissioners, three on the part of the United States
appointed by the President thereof, and three on the part of the
United Kingdom appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation
of the Governor in Council of the Dominion of Canada.
ARTICLE VIII
This International Joint Commission shall have jurisdiction over
and shall pass upon all cases involving the use or obstruction or diver-
sion of the waters with respect to which under Articles III and IV
of this treaty the approval of the Commission is required, and in pass-
ing upon such cases the Commission shall be governed by the follow-
ing rules or principles which are adopted by the High Contracting
Parties for this purpose:
The High Contracting Parties shall have, each on its own side
of the boundary, equal and similar rights in the use of the waters
hereinbefore defined as boundary waters.
The following order of precedence shall be observed among the
various uses enumerated hereinafter for these waters, and no use shall
be permitted which tends materially to conflict with or restrain any
other use which is given preference over it in this order of precedence:
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;
(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the
purpose of navigation;
(3) Uses for power and irrigation purposes.
The foregoing provisions shall not apply to or disturb any existing
uses of boundary water on either side of the boundary.
The requirement for an equal division may in the discretion of
the Commission be suspended in cases of temporary diversions along
boundary waters at points where such equal division cannot be made
advantageously on account of local conditions, and where such diver-
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sion does not diminish elsewhere the amount available for use on the
other side.
The Commission in its discretion may make its approval in any
case conditional upon the construction of remedial or protective works
to compensate so far as possible for the particular use or diversion
proposed, and in such cases may require that suitable and adequate
provision, approved by the Commission, be made for the protection
and indemnity against injury of any interests on either side of the
boundary.
In cases involving the elevation of the natural level of waters
on either side of the line as a result of the construction or maintenance
on the other side of remedial or protective works or dams or other
obstructions in boundary waters or in waters flowing therefrom or
in waters below the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary,
the Commission shall require, as a condition of its approval thereof,
that suitable and adequate provision, approved by it, be made for the
protection and indemnity of all interests on the other side of the line
which may be injured thereby.
The majority of the Commissioners shall have the power to
render a decision. In case the Commission is evenly divided upon any
question or matter presented to it for decision, separate reports shall
be made by the Commissioners on each side to their own Govern-
ment. The High Contracting Parties shall thereupon endeavor to agree
upon an adjustment of the question or matter of difference, and if
an agreement is reached between them, it shall be reduced to writing
in the form of a protocol, and shall be communicated to the Commis-
sioners, who shall take such further proceedings as may be necessary
to carry out such agreement.
ARTICLE IX
The High Contracting Parties further agree that any other ques-
tions or matters of difference arising between them involving the
rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or
to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier between
the United States and the Dominion of Canada, shall be referred from
time to time to the International Joint Commission for examination
and report, whenever either the Government of the United States
or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that such
question 'or matters of difference be so referred.
The International Joint Commission is authorized in each case
so referred to examine into and report upon the facts and cir-
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cumstances of the particular questions and matters referred, together
with such conclusions and recommendations as may be appropriate,
subject, however, to any restrictions or exceptions which may be im-
posed with respect thereto by the terms of the reference.
Such reports of the Commission shall not be regarded as deci-
sions of the questions or matters so submitted either on the facts
or the law, and in no way shall have the character of an arbitral award.
The Commission shall make a joint report to both Governments
in all cases in which all or a majority of the Commissioners agree,
and in case of disagreement the minority may make a joint report
to both Governments, or separate reports to their respective
Governments.
In case the Commission is evenly divided upon any question or
matter referred to it for report, separate reports shall be made by
the Commissioners on each side to their own Government.
ARTICLE X
Any questions or matters of difference arising between the High
Contracting Parties involving the rights, obligations, or interests of
the United States or of the Dominion of Canada either in relation
to each other or to their respective inhabitants, may be referred for
decision to the International Joint Commission by the consent of the
two Parties, it being understood that on the part of the United States
any such action will be by the advice and consent of the Senate, and
on the part of His Majesty's Government with the consent of the
Governor General in Council. In each case so referred, the said Com-
mission is authorized to examine into and report upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular questions and matters referred,
together with such conclusions and recommendations as may be ap-
propriate, subject, however, to any restrictions or exceptions which
may be imposed with respect thereto by the terms of the reference.
A majority of the said Commission shall have the power to render
a decision or finding upon any of the questions or matters so referred.
If the said Commission is equally divided or otherwise unable
to render a decision or finding as to any questions or matters so re-
ferred, it shall be the duty of the Commissioners to make a joint report
to both Governments, or separate reports to their respective Govern-
ments, showing the different conclusions arrived at with regard to
the matters or questions so referred, which questions or matters shall
thereupon be referred for decision by the High Contracting Parties
to an umpire chosen in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
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the fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of Article XLV of the Hague
Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, dated
October 18, 1907. Such umpire shall have power to render a final deci-
sion with respect to those matters and questions so referred on which
the Commission failed to agree.
ARTICLE XI
A duplicate original of all decisions rendered and joint reports
made by the Commission shall be transmitted to and filed with the
Secretary of State of the United States and the Governor General
of the Dominion of Canada, and to them shall be addressed all com-
munications of the Commission.
ARTICLE XII
The International Joint Commission shall meet and organize
promptly at Washington after the members thereof are appointed,
and when organized the Commission may fix such times and places
for its meetings as may be necessary, subject at all times to special
call or direction by the two Governments. Each Commissioner, upon
the first joint meeting of the Commission after his appointment, shall,
before proceeding with the work of the Commission, make and
subscribe a solemn declaration in writing that he will faithfully and
impartially perform the duties imposed upon him under this treaty,
and such declaration shall be entered on the records of the proceedings
of the Commission.
The United States and Canadian sections of the Commission may
each appoint a secretary, and these shall act as joint secretaries of
the Commission at its joint sessions, and the Commission may employ
engineers and clerical assistants from time to time as it may deem
advisable. The salaries and personal expenses of the Commission and
of the secretaries shall be paid by their respective governments, and
all reasonable and necessary joint expenses of the Commission, incur-
red by it, shall be paid in equal moieties by the High Contracting
Parties.
The Commission shall have power to administer oaths to
witnesses, and to take evidence on oath whenever deemed necessary
in any proceeding, or inquiry, or matter within its jurisdiction under
this treaty, and all parties interested therein shall be given conven-
ient opportunity to be heard, and the High Contracting Parties agree
to adopt such legislation as may be appropriate and necessary to give
the Commission the powers above mentioned on each side of the boun-
dary, and to provide for the issue of subpoenas and for compelling
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the attendance of witnesses in proceedings before the Commission.
The Commission may adopt such rules of procedure as shall be in
accordance with justice and equity, and may make such examination
in person and through agents or employees as may be deemed
advisable.
ARTICLE XIII
In all cases where special agreements between the High Con-
tracting Parties hereto are referred to in the foregoing articles, such
agreements are understood and intended to include not only direct
agreements between the High Contracting Parties, but also any mutual
agreements between the United States and the Dominion of Canada
expressed by concurrent or reciprocal legislation on the part of Con-
gress and the Parliament of the Dominion.
ARTICLE XIV
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the
United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty. The ratifications shall
be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible and the treaty shall
take effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications. It shall re-
main in force for five years, dating from the day of exchange of
ratifications, and thereafter until terminated by twelve months' writ-
ten notice given by either High Contracting Party to the other.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the respective plenipotentiaries have signed
this treaty in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals.
DONE at Washington the 11th day of January, in the year of
our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nine.
ELIHU ROOT [SEAL]
JAMES BRYCE [SEAL]
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